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1.1 Cooperation in Resource Allocation and
Scheduling
In today’s economy with declining profit margins and growing interest in cor-
porate social responsibility, cooperation has become increasingly important.
By merging activities or capital, companies want to reduce costs or increase
revenues. Such collaborations can be found, e.g., in purchasing situations
(Groote Schaarsberg (2014)), logistics (Cruijssen (2006)), and resource pool-
ing (Karsten (2013)).
In this dissertation, two topics are discussed. First, cooperation in re-
source allocation is considered. In resource allocation, resources are divided
among collaborating agents who value the resources differently. Here as-
signments of resources are considered such that the total joint reward is
maximized. Secondly, cooperation in a single-machine scheduling problem
is discussed. For scheduling problems the reordering of jobs with respect
to an initial processing order is considered, such that the cost savings are
maximized. Clearly, both topics involve optimization aspects.
Next to optimization, this dissertation also focusses on the sharing of
the resulting maximum total joint reward or maximum cost savings among
the participating agents. Cooperative game theory addresses the subject of
devising such allocations in an adequate and fair way. The most commonly
used model for this, is the model of transferable utility (TU) games. In
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a TU-game each coalition S of players is associated with a certain worth
v(S), which in general, corresponds to the monetary benefits this coalition
can obtain without help from players outside the coalition. By convention,
v(∅) = 0. The analysis of a TU-game focuses on how to allocate the joint
reward of the grand coalition of all agents, where the values of coalitions of
agents serve as a benchmark. Many solution concepts are proposed in the
literature, each of them having a different interpretation of a “fair” allocation.
Prominent solution concepts are the core (Gillies (1953)), the Shapley value
(Shapley (1953)), the nucleolus (Schmeidler (1969)), and the compromise
value (Tijs (1981)).
Both topics in this dissertation are related to Operations Research (OR)
games. OR games are concerned with the interrelation between operations
research and cooperative game theory. First, it considers the optimization
problem of finding a joint optimal structure like a network or processing
order. Once the optimal structure is determined, the extra gains from co-
operation are allocated by applying concepts of cooperative game theory or
by creating a context specific allocation rule. Such a rule can be based ei-
ther on desirable properties in the specific context at hand or on a kind of
decentralized mechanism that prescribes an allocation on the basis of the
algorithmic process along which a jointly optimal structure is established. A
survey of OR games is provided by Borm et al. (2001) and Curiel (2008).
They distinguish between the topics of connection (Granot and Huberman
(1982), Koster (1999)), routing (Potters et al. (1992), Bruno et al. (2011)),
production (Owen (1975)), inventory (Fiestras-Janeiro et al. (2011)), and
scheduling (Curiel et al. (2002)).
The following scheduling problem, which falls within the class of OR
games, illustrates the natural interrelation between operations research and
cooperative game theory.
Example 1.1.1. Consider a factory producing water pumps. Currently,
three jobs are scheduled, one for a farmer, one for a gardener and one for a
manufacturer. These jobs, denoted by f , g, and m, need to be scheduled on
a single machine. The processing time of a pump is the time the machine
takes to process the pump, and varies per client. Per client, the costs are
assumed to be linearly dependent on the total waiting time. For example,
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the cost function cm(z) = 3z indicates that if the pump for the manufacturer
is finished at time 3, his cost equals 9. Table 1.1 provides all data regarding
to this scheduling problem.
Client Processing time Cost function
Farmer f 3 cf (z) = z
Gardener g 1 cg(z) = z
Manufacturer m 2 cm(z) = 3z
Table 1.1: Jobs in Example 1.1.1
Initially, the jobs are scheduled in the order (f, g,m) with total joint costs
of cf (3) + cg(4) + cm(6) = 25. This order is displayed in Figure 1.1.
Assume the factory wants to determine a processing order of jobs that
minimizes the total joint costs. It turns out that the corresponding optimal
order equals (m, g, f) with total waiting costs of cm(2) + cg(3) + cf (6) = 15.
Hence, a costs saving of 10 is obtained with respect to the initial order. The
optimal order is also displayed in Figure 1.1.
f g m
0 3 4 6
m g f
0 2 3 6
Figure 1.1: Initial order (f, g,m) and optimal order (m, g, f).
This optimization problem can be transformed into a multiple decision
maker problem or game by supposing that each client (now also called a
player) is charged for its costs. This problem gives rise to an OR game ap-
proach where on the one hand we need to determine the optimal processing
order for the agents, and on the other hand, have to consider the alloca-
tion of cost savings to the players. In order to analyze this problem, Curiel
et al. (1989) formally introduced corresponding sequencing TU-games. For
sequencing games, the value of a coalition S of cooperating players is de-
fined as the maximum cost savings the coalition S can achieve by means of
reordering their jobs. It is assumed that a coalition S can only rearrange
their jobs to an order for which for all jobs of players outside S the set
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of preceding jobs remains the same. In the context of the example, each
player individually is not able to save costs and {f,m}, the coalition of the
farmer and manufacturer, is not able to change the initial order due to the
gardener’s job scheduled in-between. Now, for example, coalition {f, g} has
two possible rearrangements: initial order (f, g,m), with total waiting costs
cf(3) + cg(4) = 7, and (g, f,m) with total waiting costs cg(1) + cf(4) = 5.
Hence, {f, g} can save 2 by reordering their jobs. All coalitional values v(S)
are provided in the table below.
S {f} {g} {m} {f, g} {f,m} {g,m} {f, g,m}
v(S) 0 0 0 2 0 1 10
The allocation of the total cost savings of 10 can, e.g., be done via the
Equal Gain Splitting (EGS) rule, as introduced by Curiel et al. (1989), which
is based on the fact that the optimal order can be obtained from the initial
order by consecutive profitable switches of neighbors. According to the EGS
rule each player is allocated half of the gains of all neighbour switches he is
involved in, in order to reach an optimal order.
Here, the optimal order (m, g, f) can be reached in 3 neighbour switching
steps from the initial order (f, g,m). First, reordering (f, g,m) to (g, f,m)
involves the jobs of players f and g saving 2, which leads to allocation
(1, 1, 0). Next, reordering (g, f,m) to (g,m, f) involves the jobs of f and




). Finally, the optimal order (m, g, f) is



















For the analysis of resource allocation problems, features from bankruptcy
problems are used. Bankruptcy problems consider the allocation of a given
amount of a perfectly divisible good (the estate) among a group of agents
with rightful individual claims. Here the estate is insufficient to satisfy all
the claims. For example, consider a firm going bankrupt, whose remaining
assets do not cover the total demand of all creditors. The formal model of
bankruptcy problems was first analyzed from a game-theoretic perspective
by O’Neill (1982). The most common, rather pessimistic, translation of a
bankruptcy problem into a cooperative game, is a bankruptcy game where
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the non-negative value of a coalition of cooperating agents equals the amount
of the estate not claimed by agents outside the coalition. An overview on
bankruptcy problems and associated games can be found in Thomson (2003)
and is recently updated in Thomson (2015).
Example 1.1.2. Consider the following situation with a farmer, a gardener
and a manufacturer each claiming water from a water reservoir nearby. Each
agent requires a specific amount of water such that the sum of the claims
exceeds the available amount of 4 liters of water. Assume that the farmer
claims 3 liters of water, the gardener 1 and the manufacturer 2. Note that for
this example the estate and claims are not monetary, but concerns a perfectly
divisible good with the property “the more the better”. The corresponding
bankruptcy game v assigns to every coalition S of cooperating agents, a real
number v(S) which equals the amount of resources that is not claimed by
the agents outside S. The values v(S) for the various coalitions are given in
the table below.
S {f} {g} {m} {f, g} {f,m} {g,m} {f, g,m}
v(S) 1 0 0 2 3 1 4
In order to allocate the resources among the agents, several bankruptcy
rules have been proposed in the literature. For example, the constrained
equal award rule (CEA) allocates the estate as equal as possible among the
agents, under the restriction that no agent should receive more than his
claim. First, since the claim of the gardener is 1, each agent is assigned
1 liter of water. The remaining liter is divided equally among the farmer










The agents involved in resource allocation problems, the subject of Chap-
ter 2 and 3, optimize the assignment of resources and apply techniques from
cooperative game theory in order to allocate the corresponding maximal total
joint reward among the agents. In this setting, agents are characterized by
an individual monetary reward function which allows for monetary compen-
sations among agents, given a certain assignment of resources. Ideas from
bankruptcy are used in the sense that the value of a particular coalition re-
flects the maximum total joint reward that can be derived from the amount
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of resources not claimed by agents outside the coalition. This approach is
illustrated in the following example.
Example 1.1.3. Reconsider Example 1.1.2 where a farmer, a gardener and
a manufacturer claim water from a water reservoir with size 4. Now each
agent is characterized both by its claim and an individual (linear) reward
function, which outlines the profit per liter of water. Moreover, it is assumed
that agents cannot be assigned more than their claim. Table 1.2 provides all
data regarding to the resource allocation problem. For example, the farmer
claims 3 liters of water and has a monetary reward of 1 per liter of assigned
water.
Agent Claim Reward function
Farmer f 3 rf(z) = z
Gardener g 1 rg(z) = z
Manufacturer m 2 rm(z) = 3z
Table 1.2: Claims and Reward functions in Example 1.1.3.
It turns out that the total joint reward is maximized if the manufacturer
obtains his claim of 2 liters and the remaining 2 liters are, e.g., assigned
equally to the farmer and gardener. This yields a total joint reward of rf(1)+
rg(1) + rm(2) = 8. To analyze the joint allocation problem of 8, a resource
allocation game v is formulated which assigns to every coalition S a real
number v(S) which equals the maximum total joint reward for the coalition
S using the amount of resources not claimed by the agents outside S. This is
in line with the bankruptcy approach. The farmer on its own can use 1 liter
of water since the gardener and manufacturer only claim 3 in total, with a
reward of rf(1) = 1; coalition S = {f,m} can use 3 liters with a maximum
total joint reward of rf (1)+ rm(2) = 7. The coalitional values v(S) are given
in the table below.
S {f} {g} {m} {f, g} {f,m} {g,m} {f, g,m}
v(S) 1 0 0 2 7 3 8
♦
Papers using bankruptcy techniques to solve allocation problems in an
OR setting are Estévez Fernández (2008) in the context of delays in projects,
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Read et al. (2014) in the allocation of (scarce) water resources, and Lan-
gar et al. (2015) in resource and power allocation in cooperative Femtocell
networks.
River sharing allocation problems, the subject of Chapter 4, resemble
resource allocation problems, but an additional structure is incorporated by
means of a graph representing a river structure. Kilgour and Dinar (2001) and
Ambec and Sprumont (2002) were the first to model this type of allocation
problems as a cooperative TU-game. Moes (2013) provides an overview of
river water allocation problems. Due to the structure of the river, there
is a dependency relation among agents: the amount of water downstream
agents can retrieve depends on the amount of water upstream agents retrieve.
Similarly to OR games, optimization techniques are used for finding the
jointly optimal assignment of water to the agents. For the allocation of the
corresponding total joint reward, an adequate cooperative game is developed
and analyzed.
Example 1.1.4. Reconsider the farmer, gardener and manufacturer of
Example 1.1.3 with claims and reward functions as provided in Table 1.2.
Now these agents are assumed to be located along a single-stream river from
upstream to downstream. The inflow of the farmer, the most upstream agent,
equals 3, and of the manufacturer, most downstream, equals 1. The gardener
in between does not have any direct inflow. This river sharing allocation
problem is displayed in Figure 1.2.
farmer: 3 gardener: 1 manufacturer: 2
3 0 1
Figure 1.2: The river sharing allocation problem of Example 1.1.4
One can check that the total joint reward is maximized if the manufac-
turer is assigned 2 liters and the other 2 liters are assigned either to the
farmer or gardener, as long as the assignment to the gardener does not ex-
ceed 1. The corresponding total joint reward equals 8. To allocate 8 among
the agents a cooperative river sharing allocation game is analyzed in which
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the value v(S) of a particular coalition S reflects the maximum total joint
reward that can be derived from a cooperative assignment of water. Such
an assignment may involve leakage to agents outside the coalition. Leakage
occurs if upstream agents in coalition S transfer water to downstream agents
in S with at least one agent in-between which is not in S. These intermediate
agents are assumed to act individualistic by choosing their water use level in
order to maximize individual payoffs by using all available water up to their
claim. In particular, part of the transferred water from upstream agents in S
will not arrive at the downstream agents in S. For such instances, agents in
S have to consider whether the additional reward is sufficient to compensate
the loss by leakage.
For coalition S = {f,m}, the farmer can guarantee to get 3 liters of water
and the manufacturer can guarantee to get 1 liter of water with total joint
reward rf(3) + rm(1) = 6. However, if the farmer transfers 2 liters of water
to the manufacturer, the gardener in-between behaves individualistic and
retrieves 1 liter, such that only 1 liter arrives to the manufacturer. Together
with the manufacturer’s own inflow, an assignment is obtained where 1 liter
is assigned to farmer and 2 to the manufacturer with a total joint reward
of rf (1) + rm(2) = 7. Hence, the loss of the gardener retrieving water is
compensated by the extra marginal contribution of the manufacturer. The
corresponding river sharing allocation game v is provided in the next table.
S {f} {g} {m} {f, g} {f,m} {g,m} {f, g,m}
v(S) 3 0 3 3 7 3 8
♦
Family sequencing, the subject of Chapter 5, extends the model of Curiel
et al. (1989), as illustrated in Example 1.1.1, by considering a single machine
scheduling problem for which setup times are involved. Jobs are processed
according to an initial processing order and can be classified into distinct
families with respect to their production requirements. A job does not require
a setup when following another job from the same type, but a setup time is
required when it follows a member of another type.
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1.2 Overview
This dissertation is the collection of four self-contained essays, two of which
are published. Chapter 2 is based on Grundel et al. (2013a), which is pub-
lished in Mathematical Methods of Operations Research. Chapter 5 is based
on Grundel et al. (2013), and is published in European Journal of Opera-
tional Research. Chapter 3 appeared as a discussion paper (Grundel et al.
(2013b)). Because there is a certain overlap between the topics covered in
the various essays, some concepts are defined multiple times over the various
chapters. In the remainder of this section, we present an overview of this
dissertation by means of the abstracts of the four essays. An extensive intro-
duction of each of the different topics can be found at the beginning of each
chapter.
Chapter 2 presents an extension of the traditional bankruptcy problem.
In a resource allocation problem there is a common-pool resource, which
needs to be divided among agents. Each agent is characterized by a claim
on this pool and an individual linear monetary reward function for assigned
resources. An assignment of resources is optimal if the total joint reward
is maximized. Analyzing these problems a new class of transferable utility
games is introduced, called resource allocation games. These games are based
on the bankruptcy model, as introduced by O’Neill (1982). It is shown
that the properties of totally balancedness and compromise stability can be
extended to resource allocation games, although the property of convexity is
not maintained in general. Moreover, an explicit expression for the nucleolus
of these games is provided.
In Chapter 3 the model of Chapter 2 is generalized by characterizing
agents with concave instead of linear reward functions. We provide a neces-
sary and sufficient condition for optimality of an assignment. Analyzing the
associated allocation problem of the maximal total joint reward, we consider
corresponding resource allocation games. It is shown that these games have
a non-empty core and thus allow for stable allocations. Moreover, an explicit
expression for the nucleolus of these games is provided.
Chapter 4 analyzes river sharing allocation problems in which a set of
agents is located along a river, sharing the available water. Each agent is
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characterized by a claim of water and a strictly increasing, differentiable, and
concave reward function on the amount of retrieved water. An assignment
of water is optimal if the total joint reward is maximized. We provide a nec-
essary and sufficient condition for optimality of an assignment and provide
a methodology to obtain such an assignment. Analyzing the associated allo-
cation problem of the maximal total joint reward, we consider corresponding
river sharing allocation games. A river sharing allocation game is defined
where the value of a coalition reflects the maximal total joint reward a coali-
tion can guarantee itself. The optimal assignment of coalitions may involve
leakage, which occurs if intermediate individualists retrieve water up to their
claim. It is shown that river sharing allocation games have a non-empty core.
Chapter 5 analyzes single-machine scheduling problems with family setup
times both from an optimization and a cost allocation perspective. In a
family sequencing situation jobs are processed on a single machine, there
is an initial processing order on the jobs, and every job within a family
has an identical cost function that depends linearly on its completion time.
Moreover, a job does not require a setup when preceded by another job
from the same family while a family specific setup time is required when a
job follows a member of some other family. Explicitly taking into account
admissibility restrictions due to the presence of the initial order, we show that
for any subgroup of jobs there is an optimal order, such that all jobs of the
same family are processed consecutively. To analyze the allocation problem
of the maximal cost savings, we define and analyze a so-called corresponding
cooperative family sequencing game. Using nonstandard techniques we prove
that each family sequencing game has a non-empty core by showing that a
particular marginal vector belongs to the core. Finally, we specifically analyze
the case in which the initial order is family ordered.
Chapter 2
Resource Allocation Problems
with Linear Reward Functions
2.1 Introduction
The formal model of bankruptcy problems was first analyzed from a game-
theoretic perspective by O’Neill (1982). In a bankruptcy problem a certain
amount, the estate, has to be divided among a group of claimants. Each
claimant has a justified claim on the estate such that the sum of these claims
exceeds the available estate. The example originally given by O’Neill is that
of the division of an estate amongst several heirs when the estate cannot
meet all the deceased’s commitments. Another example is that of a firm
going bankrupt, whose remaining assets do not cover the total demand of all
creditors.
Many rules have been proposed to fairly allocate the estate in bankruptcy
problems. Some of these rules are based on the associated cooperative bank-
ruptcy game where the worth of a coalition is equal to what is left of the estate
if all other claimants would receive their demands. Aumann and Maschler
(1985) proposed and characterized a rule that coincides with the nucleolus
of this bankruptcy game. For an overview on bankruptcy rules we refer to
Thomson (2003) which is recently updated in Thomson (2015).
The bankruptcy model is a general framework for various kinds of allo-
cation problems and is applied to many cases such as cost-sharing (Moulin
(1991)), taxation (Young (1988)), and apportionment of indivisible good(s)
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problems (Young (1995)).
More generally, an allocation problem arises if a common-pool resource
needs to be divided among a group of claimants. Young (1995) introduced a
general framework with the concept of a “type” of a claimant: “the type of a
claimant is a complete description of the claimant for purposes of the alloca-
tion, and determines the extent of a claimants entitlement to the good”. A
claimant is therefore characterized by a complete description of the claimant
in several dimensions or attributes. Hereby, the traditional bankruptcy model
deals with all allocation problems in which there is one perfectly divisible
estate to be distributed among agents who can be characterized by a sin-
gle (one-dimensional) claim on that estate. Kaminski (2000), Calleja et al.
(2005), and Bergantiños et al. (2010) extend the traditional bankruptcy
model by characterizing each agent by a vector of monetary claims. In this
chapter we also extend the traditional bankruptcy problem to an allocation
problem by characterizing the agents in two attributes: a justified claim
on the resource and a linear reward function which describes the monetary
reward for assigned resources.
In a resource allocation (RA) problem there is a limited supplied resource
which is perfectly divisible. A specific resource assignment leads to some total
joint reward obtained by the agents. The aim is to find a fair allocation of
the maximum joint reward.
To illustrate the idea, consider the following economy with a manufac-
turer, a farmer and a gardener, each claiming water from the water reservoir
nearby. Each business requires a specific amount of water such that the sum
of the claims exceed the available amount of water. The profit per liter of wa-
ter varies from business to business. Therefore, the corresponding allocation
problem considers two elements. First the available water must be allotted
to the businesses. The second element is to find an allocation of the total
joint profit. In particular, profits may be redistributed among the businesses
such that businesses are compensated who cede their water to others.
The framework we propose in this chapter, which is based on Grundel
et al. (2013a) is in fact applicable to the general field of water resource man-
agement. Water resource management often involves a multitude of different
agents with different interests who put their claims on a common-pool re-
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source. The Tennessee Valley Authority case (Ransmeier (1942)) is one of
the earliest cases that offered game theorists an opportunity to examine a
practical problem of cost allocation in a water resources development project.
Straffin and Heaney (1981) outlined some basic cooperative game-theoretic
principles embedded in the analysis of this case and translated the main cost
allocation methods into ‘game theory language’. In Carraro et al. (2005),
Parrachino et al. (2006), and Zara et al. (2006) an elaborated review is
provided for game-theoretic water conflict resolution studies. For a recent
overview of the literature about game theory and water resources we refer to
Madani (2010).
A game-theoretic analysis of RA-problems also falls within the frame-
work of operations research games. These games are concerned with the
combinatorial optimization problem of finding a joint optimal structure like
a network or processing order. Once the optimal structure is determined,
game theoretical tools are applied subsequently to analyze the allocation of
the corresponding joint rewards or costs. A survey of operations research
games is provided by Borm et al. (2001).
Also for RA-problems we first analyze a joint optimization problem, the
maximization of total joint reward via an optimal assignment of resources.
Secondly, the maximum total joint reward is allocated to the agents. This is
done by analyzing the associated cooperative resource allocation (RA) game.
For this game the value of a particular coalition reflects the maximum total
joint reward that can be derived from the amount of resources not claimed
by agents outside the coalition.
Clearly, RA-games generalize bankruptcy games. For RA-games we study
which properties of bankruptcy games are preserved. Bankruptcy games are
totally balanced, convex and compromise stable. It is shown that the prop-
erties of totally balancedness and compromise stability can be extended to
RA-games, although the property of convexity is not maintained in gen-
eral. Further it is known that the nucleolus (Schmeidler (1969)) of bank-
ruptcy games can be computed by the Aumann Maschler rule (Aumann and
Maschler (1985)). Moreover, we show that the nucleolus of RA-games can
also be computed by using this rule.
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This chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2.2 the formal model
of resource allocation problems is described and the optimal assignments of
resources are characterized. In Section 2.3, we introduce and analyze corre-
sponding resource allocation games. Section 2.4 is devoted to compromise
stability and the computation of the nucleolus.
2.2 Resource Allocation Problems
This section formally introduces resource allocation (RA) problems. After
introducing the model, optimal assignments of resources, in which the total
joint reward is maximized, are characterized.
A bankruptcy problem is a triple (N,E, d), where N represents a finite
set of claimants, E ≥ 0 is the estate which has to be divided among the
claimants, and d ∈ RN++ is a vector of demands, where for i ∈ N , di represents
agent i’s claim on the estate. To justify the term ‘bankruptcy’ it is assumed
that
∑
j∈N dj ≥ E.
An RA-problem extends a bankruptcy problem (N,E, d), with an estate
E of some resource (e.g., water) and a demand vector d on this resource, by
adding a reward function in the following way. For every agent i ∈ N there
exists a reward function ri : R+ → R+ describing the monetary gain to agent
i from assigned resources. For every z ∈ R+, ri(z) denotes the monetary
reward for agent i if he is assigned z units of resource. Now, an RA-problem
can be summarized by (N,E, d, r). In this chapter the focus is on linear
reward functions. Hence, for every i ∈ N there exists an αi ∈ R++ such
that ri(z) = αiz. Hereby, for simplicity, RA-problems in this chapter will be
referred to as (N, e, d, α). The class of all RA-problems with set of agents N
is denoted by RAN .
An outcome for an RA-problem consists of two elements: an assignment
x(N, e, d, α) of resources and an allocation y(N, e, d, α) of the associated mon-
etary reward. Throughout this chapter ‘assignment’ refers to the distribution
of resources (e.g., water) and ‘allocation’ to the distribution of rewards (e.g.,
money). For the remainder of this chapter, x(N, e, d, α) is denoted by x and
y(N, e, d, α) is denoted by y. Formally, a solution f : RAN → RN × RN is
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defined by




xj = E (2.1)







yi ≥ 0 for all i ∈ N (2.4)
for all (N, e, d, α) ∈ RAN . Constraint (2.1) tells us that the sum of assigned
resources is equal to the estate. Constraint (2.2) ensures that the assigned
resources do not exceed the individual demand and are non-negative for all
agents in N . Let F (N, e, d, α) be the set of feasible assignments x determined
by conditions (2.1) and (2.2), i.e.









xj = E, 0 ≤ xi ≤ di for all i ∈ N
}
.
Constraint (2.3) ensures that the total reallocated sum of rewards is equal to
the total joint reward obtained from the underlying assignment x. Assume
that no costs are involved for transferring rewards. One specific type of solu-
tion is the direct solution. A solution f is called direct, if for all (N, e, d, α) ∈
RAN , we have that f(N, e, d, α) = (x, r(x)) for some x ∈ F (N, e, d, α), where
r(x) = (αixi)i∈N is the direct reward vector with respect to x.
Example 2.2.1. Consider an RA-problem (N, e, d, α) ∈ RAN with N =
{1, 2, 3} and estate E = 4. Assume that agent 1 claims 3 units of resource,
agent 2 claims 1 unit, and agent 3 claims 2. Therefore, the demand vector
is d = (3, 1, 2). Note that the sum of these demands exceeds the available
estate such that not all agents can obtain their full demand. With reward
vector α = (1, 1, 3), e.g., the reward function of agent 1 is given by r1(z) = z
for z such that 0 ≤ z ≤ d1. The feasible assignment x = (2, 1, 1) has total
joint reward 6 and r(x) = (2, 1, 3). Note that r(x) but also e.g., y = (2, 2, 2),
satisfy conditions (2.3) and (2.4). ♦
The set of feasible assignments is large and there are many possible
(re)allocations of the corresponding rewards. Throughout this article, as-
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signments of resources which maximize the total joint reward are considered.
The remainder of this section is dedicated to finding these optimal assign-
ments.
Let (N, e, d, α) ∈ RAN . The maximum total joint reward v(N, e, d, α) is
determined by









x ∈ F (N, e, d, α)
}
.
The set X(N, e, d, α) of optimal assignments is given by
X(N, e, d, α) =
{







rj(xj) = v(N, e, d, α)
}
.
Before characterizing the set X(N, e, d, α) of optimal assignments we in-
troduce some additional notation. Write {αj|j ∈ N} = {β1, β2, . . . , βm} with
β1 > β2 > · · · > βm and define
Nl = {j ∈ N |αj = βl}
for all l ∈ {1, . . . , m}. Hence, each set of agents Nl contains all agents i ∈ N
with reward parameter βl = αi. Denote the total demand of agents in Nl as
d(Nl), i.e. d(Nl) =
∑
j∈Nl
dj. Thus, this new notation is used to ‘aggregate’
agents with equal reward parameters and sort those in decreasing order by











j∈N dj, then we assume k = m. With pivot index k define three
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Note that P1 and P3 may be empty, but P2 is always non-empty. Hence, P1
contains all agents with reward parameters greater than βk, and P3 all agents
with reward parameters lower than βk.
Example 2.2.2. Reconsider the RA-problem of Example 2.2.1. Clearly,
there are two different reward parameters, i.e. m = 2, N1 = {3} with
β1 = α3 = 3 and N2 = {1, 2} with β2 = α1 = α2 = 1. Observe that
d(N1) = 2 < E = 4 < d(N1) + d(N2) = 6.
Hence, the pivot index is k = 2. Consequently, P1 = N1 = {3}, P2 = N2 =
{1, 2}, and P3 = ∅. ♦
It is readily verified that the total joint reward is maximized, if the re-
sources are assigned to agents in decreasing order of their reward parameter.
By definition it holds that the estate suffices to meet the demand of all agents
in P1 and some of the demand of agents in P2. Moreover, it holds that the
reward parameters of agents in P1 are greater then those in P2, which have a
greater reward parameter then agents in P3. Consequently, assignments such
that agents in P1 are assigned their demand and agents in P3 are assigned
no resources, are optimal. These optimal assignments, are characterized in
the following theorem.
Theorem 2.2.1. Let (N, e, d, α) ∈ RAN and x ∈ F (N, e, d, α). Then x ∈
X(N, e, d, α) if and only if xi = di for all i ∈ P1 and xi = 0 for all i ∈ P3.
Proof. Let x ∈ X(N, e, d, α). First suppose there exists an agent i ∈ P1 such
that xi < di. This implies that
∑
j∈P2∪P3
xj = E −
∑
j∈P1
xj > E −
∑
j∈P1





We may conclude that there is at least one agent j ∈ P2 ∪ P3 for which
xj > 0. Since αj < αi, the total joint reward would strictly increase if agent
j transfers min{di − xi, xj} to agent i. This establishes a contradiction.
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The first equality follows from (2.1), the first inequality from (2.2). The
second inequality follows from (2.5), the last equality from the definitions







there is at least one agent j ∈ P1 ∪ P2 whose demand is not fully satisfied,
i.e. xj < dj. Since αj > αi, the total joint reward would increase if agent
i transfers min{dj − xj , xi} to agent j. This establishes a contradiction and
proves the only if part.
All assignments x ∈ F (N, e, d, α) such that xi = di for all i ∈ P1 and
xi = 0 for all i ∈ P3 lead to the same total joint reward. Clearly, such
assignment exists by the fact that
∑
j∈N rj(xj) is a real-valued continuous
function on a non-empty, compact interval. This finishes the proof.
Hence, the pivot index k is used to specify the set of agents Nk, the set
which may not obtain the full demand in the optimal assignment of resources;
all agents with larger reward parameters obtain their full demand, agents
with a lower reward parameter obtain nothing.
Example 2.2.3. The set of optimal assignments of the RA-problem of
Example 2.2.1 can be written as follows:
Conv{(2, 0, 2), (1, 1, 2)}.
♦
As can be seen in Example 2.2.3, the optimal assignment is not necessarily
unique. The RA-problems for which there is exactly one optimal assignment
are characterized in the following corollary.
Corollary 2.2.2. Let (N, e, d, α) ∈ RAN . Then |X(N, e, d, α)| = 1 if and
only if E =
∑
j∈P1
dj or |P2| = 1.
2.3 Resource Allocation Games
In this section we introduce the class of resource allocation (RA) games. A
transferable utility (TU) game is an ordered pair (N, v) where N is the finite
set of agents, and v the characteristic function on 2N , the set of all subsets
of N . The function v assigns to every coalition S ∈ 2N a real number v(S)
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with v(∅) = 0. Here, v(S) is called the worth or value of the coalition S.
The set of all TU-games with set of agents N is denoted by TUN . Where no
confusion arises, we write v rather than (N, v).
Consider a bankruptcy problem (N,E, d). For the associated bankruptcy
(BR) game vE,d the value of a coalition S is determined by the amount of E












for all S ∈ 2N .
Now consider an RA-problem (N, e, d, α). We assume that a coalition
S can only use the amount of resources D(S) not demanded by the agents
in N \ S. Let (S,D(S), d|S, α|S) ∈ RA
S describe the associated resource













Note that D(N) = E. By the fact that D(S) ≤
∑
j∈S dj it follows that
(S,D(S), d|S, α|S) again is an RA-problem.
Corollary 2.3.1. Let (N,E, d, α) ∈ RAN and let S ⊂ N . Then
(S,D(S), d|S, α|S) ∈ RA
S.
In the RA-game vR, associated to an RA-problem (N, e, d, α), the worth
of coalition S equals
vR(S) = v (S,D(S), d|S, α|S) .
The class of RA-games extends the class of BR-games, i.e. every BR-game
can be written as an RA-game in which αi = αj for all i, j ∈ N .
Let Sl = S ∩ Nl for all l ∈ {1, . . . , m}. We extend the definition of the
pivot index, as provided in (2.5) for the grand coalition, to every possible
1d|S ∈ RS denotes the restricted vector of demands (reward parameter) for agents in
S with respect to d ∈ RN , i.e. d|s = (di)i∈S .
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If D(S) = 0, then we assume that k(S) = 1 and if D(S) =
∑
j∈S dj, then we
assume k(S) = m.
Let xS ∈ X(S,D(S), d|S, α|S) be an optimal assignment of resources to
agents in S. Theorem 2.2.1 tells us that xSi = di for all i ∈ S1 ∪ · · · ∪ Sk(S)−1
and xSi = 0 for all i ∈ Sk(S)+1 ∪ · · · ∪ Sm. The remaining resources (D(S)−
∑k(S)−1
l=1 d(Sl)) are assigned to agents in Sk(S). Clearly, v
R(S) equals the total
direct reward of agents in S associated to xS. This allows us to construct an
explicit formula for vR(S).















for all S ∈ 2N \ {∅}.
Example 2.3.1. Reconsider the RA-problem of Example 2.2.1 where
E = 4, d = (3, 1, 2) and α = (1, 1, 3). The corresponding values of D(S),
k(S), and vR(S) are given in the table below.
S 1 2 3 1,2 1,3 2,3 N
D(S) 1 0 0 2 3 1 4
k(S) 2 1 1 2 2 1 2
vR(S) 1 0 0 2 7 3 8
Firstly, we illustrate the underlying computations for coalition S = {1, 2}.
Recall m = 2, N1 = {3} and N2 = {1, 2}. Therefore, S1 = ∅ and S2 = {1, 2}.
The amount of available resources equals
D(S) = max{0, 4− 2} = 2.
This yields,
d(S1) < D(S) < d(S1) + d(S2)
0 < 2 < 0 + 4
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and consequently, k(S) = 2. Therefore,
vR(12) = β1d(S1) + β2(D(S)− d(S1))
= 3 · 0 + 1(2− 0) = 2.
Secondly, consider S = {2}. Then D(S) = max{0, 4 − 3 − 2} = 0. So,
k(S) = 1 and vR(S) = 0. ♦
From Example 2.3.1 we immediately see that RA-games are not convex
in general since the condition
v(S ∪ {i})− v(S) ≤ v(T ∪ {i})− v(T )
for all S ⊂ T ⊂ N \ {i} and all i ∈ N , is violated for S = {3}, T = {2, 3}
and i = 1.
Lemma 2.3.3 describes a relation between pivot indices of two coalitions.
It tells us that all agents preceding (with respect to the decreasing order by
β) pivot k(S), are also preceding pivot k(T ) when set S is extended to T .
Lemma 2.3.3. Let (N, e, d, α) ∈ RAN . Let S, T ∈ 2N be such that S ⊂ T .
Then
k(S) ≤ k(T ).
Proof. Let S ⊂ T ⊂ N . In order to prove that k(S) ≤ k(T ), we first assume
















This implies D(S) = 0 and k(S) = 1.
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If D(S) = 0, then k(S) = 1 ≤ k(T ) by definition. Therefore, we may
assume that D(S) > 0 and D(S) = D(T )−
∑




























where the first and last inequality follows from (2.6). This implies that
k(S)− 1 < k(T ) and consequently k(S) ≤ k(T ).
Lemma 2.3.4 provides a monotonicity result for optimal assignments.
Hence, each set of agents Sl, with l ∈ {1, . . . , m} obtains at most as much
resources in the optimal assignment xS of a coalition S, as it obtains in the
optimal assignment xT of a larger coalition T .
Lemma 2.3.4. Let (N, e, d, α) ∈ RAN . Let S, T ∈ 2N be such that S ⊂ T .
Let xT ∈ X(T,D(T ), d|T , α|T ) and x







for all l ∈ {1, . . . , m}.
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Proof. Let l ∈ {1, . . . , m}. If D(S) = 0, then it holds that
∑
j∈Sl




Assume D(S) > 0. Then D(T ) > 0 and, as before in the proof of Lemma
2.3.3, this implies that D(S) = D(T )−
∑
j∈T\S dj. If l > k(S), then x
S
j = 0
for all j ∈ Sl and
∑
j∈Sl














Since S ⊂ T , it follows from Lemma 2.3.3 that k(S) ≤ k(T ). Therefore, the

































































where the first and fifth equality hold by Theorem 2.2.1.
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A game v ∈ TUN is called balanced if the core C(v) of the game is non-
empty. The core of a game consists of those efficient allocations such that no

















Theorem 2.3.5. Let (N, e, d, α) ∈ RAN with corresponding RA-game vR
and let xN ∈ X(N,E, d, α). Let y = (αix
N
i )i∈N be the direct allocation.
Then y ∈ C(vR).
Proof. First note that
∑
j∈N yj = v
R(N) by definition. Secondly, consider







































The second and third equality follows from Theorem 2.2.1. From Lemma
2.3.3 we see that k(S) ≤ k. If k(S) < k, then the inequality is readily
verified. If k(S) = k, then we use Lemma 2.3.4 to see that this inequality
holds. The last equality follows from Theorem 2.3.2.
By Theorem 2.3.5 it follows that RA-games are balanced. In fact, by
Corollary 2.3.1 it follows that every RA-game is totally balanced.
Corollary 2.3.6. Every RA-game is totally balanced.
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2.4 Compromise Stability and the Nucleolus
In this section we prove that RA-games are compromise stable and we derive
an explicit expression for the nucleolus of RA-games.
Quant et al. (2005) defined a game v ∈ TUN to be compromise stable if
C(v) = CC(v)
and CC(v) 6= ∅. Here the core cover CC(v), as introduced by Tijs and










yj = v(N), m(v) ≤ y ≤M(v)
}
where the utopia demand Mi(v) of agent i ∈ N is defined by
Mi(v) = v(N)− v(N\{i})














Note that mi(v) ≥ v({i}) for all i ∈ N . Moreover, for any TU-game v,
C(v) ⊂ CC(v) holds. Thus, the core cover equals the set of all efficient
allocation vectors such that players receive at least their minimum right but
no more than their utopia demand.
Moreover, it was proved by Quant et al. (2005) that each BR-game is both
convex and compromise stable while reversely, each convex and compromise
stable game is strategically equivalent2 to a BR-game.
In what follows N−i is a shorthand notation for N \ {i}.
Lemma 2.4.1. Let (N, e, d, α) ∈ RAN , let vR be the corresponding RA-game,
and let i ∈ N .
2Two TU-games v and w with player set N are called strategically equivalent if there
exist a positive real number k and a vector a ∈ RN such that w(S) = kv(S) +
∑
j∈S aj
for all S ∈ 2N .
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1. If di ≥ E, then Mi(v
R) = vR(N).
2. If di < E , then
a. Mi(v
R) = αidi if i ∈ P1;
b. Mi(v






















if i ∈ P2 ∪ P3 and k(N−i) < k(N).
Proof. 1: Let di ≥ E. Then D(N−i) = 0 and v
R(N−i) = 0. Therefore,
Mi(v
R) = vR(N)− vR(N−i) = v
R(N).
2: Let di < E. Set k = k(N),




































βld(Nl)− αidi + βk
(









R) = vR(N)− vR(N−i) = αidi.
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If k(N−i) = k, then this simplifies into
Mi(v
R) = βkdi.

























M(vR) constitutes an upper bound for the amount the agents reasonable
can demand by allocating vR(N) among the agents. Those agents, who
renounce their demand to the resources in order to obtain a larger total joint
reward, are compensated by those agents who do obtain resources in the
optimal assignment. It seems fair that the value of these renounced resources,
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and hence the compensation, is determined by the reward parameters of these
latter agents. This can be seen from Lemma 2.4.1 since the utopia demands
of e.g. agents in P3 are computed without using their own reward parameter
α. Hereby, the utopia demand of an agent i ∈ P2 ∪ P3 may exceed αidi (if
di ≤ E). This is illustrated in the following example.
Example 2.4.1. Consider the RA-problem of Example 2.3.1 with vR ∈
RAN . The vector of utopia demands equals M(vR) = (5, 1, 6). Note that
M1(v
R) = 5 > α1d1 = 3.
This agent 1 obtains at most 2 units of resources in the optimal assignment,
which is worth 2α1 = 2. The renounced unit of resources (d1 − 2 = 1) is
valued using the reward parameter of the agent who does receive his full
demand, i.e. 1α3 = 3. ♦
Quant et al. (2005) proved that a game v ∈ TUN is compromise stable














for all S ∈ 2N \ {∅}.
Theorem 2.4.2. Every RA-game is compromise stable.
Proof. Clearly, m(vR) ≥ 0 for an RA-game vR. Let S ∈ 2N \ {∅}. According














in order to establish compromise stability.
For D(S) = 0 it holds that vR(S) = 0 and inequality (2.7) is easily
verified.
Let D(S) > 0. This implies that vR(S) > 0 and di < E for all i ∈ N \ S.





R) ≥ vR(S) (2.8)
2.4. Compromise Stability and the Nucleolus 29
Set k = k(N). First let
⋃m
l=k (Nl \ Sl) = ∅. This tells us that
D(S) = E −
∑
j∈N\S






















































































































































































































Here, the first equality follows from Theorem 2.3.2 and Lemma 2.4.1(2a).
The inequality holds because βk < βl for all l ∈ {k(S), . . . , k − 1}. The last
equality follows from the fact that Mi(v












(Nl \ Sl) be such
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The first equality follows from Theorem 2.3.2 and Lemma 2.4.1(2a,2b). The
third equality holds by using Lemma 2.3.3 such that k(N−i∗) ≥ k(S) for i
∗ ∈
N \ S. The first and second inequality are due to the fact that βk(N−i∗ ) < βl
for all l ∈ {k(S), . . . , k(N−i∗) − 1}, βk(N−i∗) > βl for all l ∈ {k(N−i∗) +
1, . . . , k − 1}, and βk(N−i∗) ≥ βk(N−j) for all j ∈
⋃m
l=k(Nl \ Sl). For this note
that for all j ∈
⋃m
l=k(Nl \Sl), βk(N−i∗ ) ≥ βk(N−j) by the fact that di∗ ≥ dj.
Next we derive an explicit expression for a specific core element of an RA-
game: the nucleolus (Schmeidler (1969)). Recall (cf. Aumann and Maschler
(1985)) that the nucleolus n(vE,d) of a bankruptcy game vE,d ∈ TU
N can be
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computed as follows:




























CEA(Ẽ, d̃) = (min{λ, d̃i})i∈N
with λ such that
∑
j∈N min{λ, d̃j} = Ẽ.
Although vR is not necessarily convex and therefore not strategically
equivalent to a BR-game (ref. Quant et al. (2005)), the nucleolus of vR
corresponds to the AM-rule of a related bankruptcy problem.














R) ≥ vR(N) = Ê
because C(vR) 6= ∅ and the core is a subset of the core cover for any game.
Hence (Ê, d̂) is a bankruptcy problem and, consequently
n(vÊ,d̂) = AM(Ê, d̂).
Next we show that C(vR) = C(vÊ,d̂). Observe that v
R(N) = vÊ,d̂(N).
Since RA-games satisfy inequality (2.7), which implies that
vR(S) ≤ vÊ,d̂(S)
for all S ∈ 2N \{∅}, it is clear that C(vÊ,d̂) ⊂ C(v
R). To prove also the reverse
inclusion, let y ∈ C(vR) and S ⊂ N . We will prove that
∑


























Potters and Tijs (1994) proved that for any two games v, w ∈ TUN with









Example 2.4.2. Consider the RA-problem of Example 2.3.1 with













In this chapter, which is based on Grundel et al. (2013b), we analyze a
resource allocation model with a common-pool resource in which the sum
of the claims of all agents exceeds the total amount of resources. Young
(1995) introduced a general framework for the “type” of a claimant: “the
type of a claimant is a complete description of the claimant for purposes of
the allocation, and determines the extent of a claimant’s entitlement to the
good”. In our model we assume that the claim represents the maximum of
resources an agent can handle. Therefore, an agent is never assigned more
than this claim. Furthermore, we characterize each agent by an individual
strictly increasing, continuous, and concave monetary reward function which
allows for monetary compensations among agents, given a certain assignment
of resources. This chapter generalizes the model in Chapter 2 where resource
allocation problems of this type are considered for agents with linear reward
functions.
Our model is applicable for various kinds of common-pool resource prob-
lems. For example, consider a common-pool of water, which should be dis-
tributed among a farmer, a large-scale horticultural company and a factory.
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There is insufficient water to meet the rightful claims of all agents. The pos-
sibility of compensating agents who cede water to others monetarily, allows
agents to search for acceptable and fair alternatives. Agents who do not ob-
tain their claim can use this compensation for possible alternatives to using
water. If an agent requires water more urgently than others at a certain
level of assigned water, then this is incorporated in the model by appropriate
concavity requirements in the reward functions.
Sustainable exploitation of common-pool natural resources, such as water,
requires cooperation among users (Ostrom et al. (1994)). In practice, agents
coordinate water extraction through various arrangements. They specify the
assignment of water and compensation through monetary transfers (Ostrom
et al. (1994) and Dinar (2007)). The economic literature includes several
papers that focus on various aspects of international water sharing issues
and their stability in a basin setting (Ambec and Sprumont (2002), Ambec
and Ehlers (2008), Wang (2011), Weikard et al. (2013), Van den Brink et al.
(2012)). For specific issues in resolutions in water resource management,
we refer to Dinar (2004). Water resource issues have not only been modeled
using cooperative game theory (see Parrachino et al. (2006) for an overview),
but also using non-cooperative game theory (see Harris and Townsend (1981),
Myerson (1979) for models with incomplete information and Pálvölgyi et al.
(2010), Carraro et al. (2005), Condorelli (2013) for models with complete
information).
In analyzing resource allocation problems, an assignment of resources is
called optimal if the total joint monetary reward is maximized. It is shown
that an assignment is optimal if and only if there does not exist a pair of
agents for whom the sum of rewards increases by transferring resources from
one agent to another. We show, by means of an example, how this charac-
terization can be used to check optimality of an assignment. Then we apply
cooperative game theory in order to allocate the corresponding maximal to-
tal joint reward in an adequate and fair way among the agents. In particular,
we introduce a new class of transferable utility games, which is inspired by
bankruptcy games (O’Neill (1982)). For these resource allocation games the
value of a particular coalition reflects the maximum total joint reward that
can be derived from the resources not claimed by the agents outside the
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coalition. We show that these games allow for core allocations which are
stable against coalitional deviations. We analyze the nucleolus (Schmeidler
(1969)) as a stable allocation rule and provide an explicit expression for the
allocation prescribed by the nucleolus for a resource allocation game.
This chapter it is organized as follows. In Section 3.2 the formal model of
resource allocation problems is provided and optimal assignments of resources
are characterized. In Section 3.3, we introduce corresponding resource allo-
cation games and show the existence of stable allocations and analyze the
nucleolus of these games. The concluding remarks in Section 3.4 concern the
relation between RA-problems with linear reward function, as provided in
Chapter 2, and RA-problems with concave reward functions.
3.2 Resource Allocation Problems
This section formally introduces resource allocation (RA) problems, and char-
acterizes optimal assignments of resources.
An RA-problem considers the assignment of resources among agents who
have a claim on a common-pool resource. Let N represent the finite set of
agents, E ≥ 0 the total amount (estate) of resources which has to be divided
among the agents, and d ∈ (0,∞)N a vector of demands, where for i ∈ N ,
di represents agent i’s claim on the estate. It is assumed that
∑
j∈N dj ≥ E.
Furthermore, for each agent i ∈ N there exists a reward function ri on [0, di]
describing the monetary reward to agent i: for every z ∈ [0, di], ri(z) denotes
the monetary reward for agent i if he is assigned z units of resource. In this
chapter is assumed that for all i ∈ N , ri is a strictly increasing, continuous,
and concave reward function on [0, di] with ri(0) = 0. An RA-problem will be
summarized by (N,E, d, r), with r = {ri}i∈N . The class of all RA-problems
with set of agents N is denoted by RAN .
Let F (N,E, d, r) denote the set of assignments of resources given by









xj = E, xi ∈ [0, di] for all i ∈ N
}
.
So, in an assignment, we assume that the complete estate E is assigned
among the agents and that no agent can get more than its demand.
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Throughout this article, assignments of resources which maximize the
total joint monetary reward are considered. The remainder of this section is
dedicated to characterizing these optimal assignments.
Let (N,E, d, r) ∈ RAN . The maximum total joint monetary reward
v(N,E, d, r) is determined by









x ∈ F (N,E, d, r)
}
.
Note that this maximum exists due to the fact that
∑
j∈N rj is continuous
on a compact domain. Furthermore, Lemma 3.2.1 shows that v(N,E, d, r) is
concave in the second coordinate E.
Lemma 3.2.1. Let (N,E, d, r) ∈ RAN . Then v(N,E, d, r) is concave in E.
Proof. Let A,B ≥ 0 such that
∑
j∈N dj ≥ A and
∑
j∈N dj ≥ B. We will
prove that for all δ ∈ [0, 1] it holds that
δv(N,A, d, r) + (1− δ)v(N,B, d, r) ≤ v (N, δA+ (1− δ)B, d, r) .




j ) and let













































x ∈ F (N, δA+ (1− δ)B, d, r)
}
= v (N, δA+ (1− δ)B, d, r) .
The first inequality follows from concavity of rj. The second inequality
is due to the fact that (δxAi + (1− δ)x
B
i )i∈N ∈ F (N, δA+ (1− δ)B, d, r).
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The set X(N,E, d, r) of optimal assignments is given by
X(N,E, d, r) =
{







rj(xj) = v(N,E, d, r)
}
.
The next theorem characterizes optimal assignments. It tells us that an
assignment is optimal if and only if there does not exist a pair of agents for
whom the sum of rewards increases by transferring resources from one agent
to another.
Theorem 3.2.2. Let (N,E, d, r) ∈ RAN and x ∈ F (N,E, d, r). Then x ∈
X(N,E, d, r) if and only if for all i ∈ N with xi < di and for all k ∈ N \ {i}
with xk > 0, there does not exist a positive ǫ ∈ (0,min{di−xi, xk}] such that
ri(xi + ǫ) + rk(xk − ǫ) > ri(xi) + rk(xk).
1
Proof. We first prove the “only if” part. Let x ∈ X(N,E, d, r). Suppose
there exist an i ∈ N with xi < di, a k ∈ N \ {i} with xk > 0, and an
ǫ ∈ (0,min{di − xi, xk}] such that ri(xi + ǫ) + rk(xk − ǫ) > ri(xi) + rk(xk).
Now consider x′ such that x′j = xj for all j ∈ N \ {i, k}, x
′
i = xi + ǫ, and
x′k = xk− ǫ. Note that x

























This establishes a contradiction with the optimality of x.
For the “if” part, let x ∈ F (N,E, d, r) and x /∈ X(N,E, d, r). We will
prove that there exists an i ∈ N with xi < di, a k ∈ N \{i} with xk > 0, and
an ǫ ∈ (0,min{di−xi, xk}] such that ri(xi+ ǫ)+ rk(xk − ǫ) > ri(xi)+ rk(xk).
1If (N, e, d, r) ∈ RAN is such that for all i ∈ N, ri is differentiable, then the conditions in
Theorem 3.2.2 implies the necessary conditions that follow from the Kuhn-Tucker Theorem
(Kuhn and Tucker (1951)) for an assignment to be optimal.
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Let xN ∈ X(N,E, d, r). Clearly both sets A1 = {i ∈ N |x
N
i > xi} and
A2 = {k ∈ N |x
N
k < xk} are nonempty. Note that for all i ∈ A1 it holds that
xNi > 0 and xi < di. Vice versa, for all k ∈ A2 it holds that xk > 0 and
xNk < dk. The reward functions of agents i ∈ A1 and k ∈ A2 are outlined in
Figure 3.1. By concavity of r it holds that, for all i ∈ A1 and ǫ ∈ (0, x
N
i −xi],
Figure 3.1: Reward functions of agents i ∈ A1 and k ∈ A2.




i − ǫ), (3.1)





k + ǫ)− rk(x
N
k ) ≥ rk(xk)− rk(xk − ǫ). (3.2)
From the fact that xN ∈ X(N,E, d, r) it follows from the only if part that,
for all i ∈ A1, k ∈ A2 and ǫ ∈ (0,min{x
N







i − ǫ) ≥ rk(x
N
k + ǫ)− rk(x
N
k ). (3.3)
Since (0,min{xNi − xi, xk − x
N
k }] ⊂ (0,min{x
N
i , dk − x
N
k }], subsequently ap-
plying (3.1), (3.3), and (3.2) imply that, for all i ∈ A1 and k ∈ A2 and for
all ǫ ∈ (0,min{xNi − xi, xk − x
N
k }],
ri(xi + ǫ)− ri(xi) ≥ rk(xk)− rk(xk − ǫ).
Suppose for all i ∈ A1, k ∈ A2 and ǫ ∈ (0,min{x
N
i −xi, xk −x
N
k }] it holds
that
ri(xi + ǫ)− ri(xi) = rk(xk)− rk(xk − ǫ).
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Let i ∈ A1, k ∈ A2 and ǫ ∈ (0,min{x
N
i −xi, xk − x
N
k }]. Since inequality (3.1)
is an equality now we have





By the fact that ri is a strictly increasing, continuous, and concave function
and ǫ > 0 this tells us that ri is linear on [xi, x
N
i ]. This is outlined in Figure
3.2. Similarly, we have an equality in (3.2) which implies that
Figure 3.2: Linearity on [xi, x
N





k + ǫ)− rk(x
N
k ) = rk(xk)− rk(xk − ǫ)
which tells us that rk is linear on [x
N






i − ǫ) = rk(x
N
k + ǫ)− rk(x
N
k ).
By linearity of ri on [xi, x
N
i ] and rk on [x
N
k , xk] and the fact that the difference
quotient of ri on [xi, x
N
i ] equals the difference quotient of rk on [x
N
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The second equality holds by the fact that for all i ∈ N \ (A1∪A2), xi = x
N
i ,
the third equality follows from (3.4).
This implies that x ∈ X(N,E, d, r) which establishes a contradiction.
Hence, there exists at least one pair of agents i ∈ A1, k ∈ A2 and ǫ ∈
(0,min{xNi − xi, xk − x
N
k }], such that
ri(xi + ǫ)− ri(xi) > rk(xk)− rk(xk − ǫ).
Since (0,min{xNi − xi, xk − x
N
k }] ⊂ (0,min{di − xi, xk}], this finishes the
proof.
The following example illustrates how the conditions in Theorem 3.2.2
can be used in order to check optimality of an assignment of resources.
Example 3.2.1. Consider an RA-problem (N,E, d, r) ∈ RAN with N =
{1, 2, 3, 4}, estate E = 7, and vector of demands d = (1, 3, 4, 1). The reward







2z, if 0 ≤ z ≤ 2,
z + 2, if 2 < z ≤ 4,






















, and total joint reward 231
4
.
We can use Theorem 3.2.2 to check optimality of this assignment. For
each pair of agents (i, k) it should hold for all ǫ ∈ (0,min{di − xi, xk}] that
ri(xi + ǫ) + rk(xk − ǫ) ≤ ri(xi) + rk(xk). From ǫ > 0, x1 = d1, and x4 = 0
it follows, respectively, that i 6= 1 and k 6= 4. Theorem 3.2.2 with k = 1
prescribes that for all i ∈ {2, 3, 4} and all ǫ ∈ (0,min{di − xi, 1}], it should
hold that ri(xi + ǫ) + r1(1− ǫ) ≤ ri(xi) + r1(1) or equivalently, that






Inequality (3.5) holds since we know that for all i ∈ {2, 3, 4} and ǫ ∈ (0, di−xi]
ri(xi + ǫ)− ri(xi)
ǫ
≤ 1,
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Theorem 3.2.2 with k = 2 and i = 3 prescribes that for all ǫ ∈ (0, 1
2
], it



















































































































































The check for optimality of x with k = 3 and i = 2 is analogous to k = 2
and i = 3, for k = 3 and i = 4 we use an argument similar to k = 2 and
i = 4. ♦
Now consider a subgroup S ⊂ N . For a resource allocation problem
(N,E, d, r) ∈ RAN the maximum total joint reward of a subgroup S ⊂ N
with E ′ ≤ E and E ′ ≤
∑
j∈S dj equals v(S,E
′, d|S, r|S)
2. The next proposi-
tion shows that total maximization implies partial maximization.
Proposition 3.2.3. Let (N,E, d, r) ∈ RAN and xN ∈ X(N,E, d, r). Then




j , d|S, r|S).
2d|S ∈ RS denotes the restricted vector of demands for agents in S with respect to
d ∈ RN ; r|S refers to {rj(z)}j∈S
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d|S, r|S). Suppose there exists an x












j ). Let x ∈ R
N be such that for all i ∈ S : xi = x
S
i
and for all i ∈ N \ S : xi = x
N
i . By the fact that for all i ∈ N it holds that






















































which establishes a contradiction with the fact that xN is optimal.
3.3 Resource Allocation Games
In this section we associate to each RA-problem a cooperative resource allo-
cation (RA) game. A transferable utility (TU) game is an ordered pair (N, v)
where N is the finite set of agents, and v the characteristic function on 2N ,
the set of all subsets of N . The function v assigns to every coalition S ∈ 2N
a real number v(S) with v(∅) = 0. Here, v(S) is called the worth or value
of coalition S. Here the coalitional value v(S) is interpreted as the maximal
total joint reward for coalition S when cooperating on its own. The values
v(S), S ∈ 2N , serve as reference points on the basis of which allocations of
v(N) are considered to be fair or stable. The set of all TU-games with set of
agents N is denoted by TUN . Where no confusion arises, we write v rather
than (N, v).
Consider an RA-problem (N,E, d, r). We assume that a coalition S can
only use the amount of resources D(S) such that all agents outside S obtain
resources up to their demand d ∈ RN+ . Let (S,D(S), d|S, r|S) ∈ RA
S describe













Note that D(N) = E. By the fact that D(S) ≤
∑
j∈S dj it follows that
(S,D(S), d|S, r|S) again is an RA-problem.
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Corollary 3.3.1. Let (N,E, d, r) ∈ RAN and let S ⊂ N . Then
(S,D(S), d|S, r|S) ∈ RA
S.
In the RA-game, vR associated to an RA-problem (N,E, d, r), the worth
of a coalition S ∈ 2N is defined as
vR(S) = v (S,D(S), d|S, r|S) .
Let xS ∈ X(S,D(S), d|S, r|S) be an optimal assignment of resources to agents
in S. Clearly, vR(S) equals the total reward of agents in S associated to
xS. For simplicity, we write v(S,D(S)), rather than v(S,D(S), d|S, r|S),
F (S,D(S)), rather than F (S,D(S), d|S, r|S), and X(S,D(S)), rather than
X(S,D(S), d|S, r|S).
A game v ∈ TUN is called balanced if the core C(v) of the game is non-
empty. The core of a game consists of those allocations of v(N) such that no

















Theorem 3.3.2. Let (N,E, d, r) ∈ RAN with corresponding RA-game vR ∈
TUN , and choose xN ∈ X(N,E). Let yN = (ri(x
N
i ))i∈N . Then, y
N ∈ C(vR).








































x ∈ F (S,D(S))
}
= vR(S).
The second equality follows from Proposition 3.2.3. The inequality follows














xNj = E −
∑
j∈N\S
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because xNi ≤ di for all i ∈ N . Since, obviously x
N









By Theorem 3.3.2 it follows that RA-games are balanced. Furthermore,
by Corollary 3.3.1 it follows that every RA-game is totally balanced.
Corollary 3.3.3. Every RA-game is totally balanced.
The next lemma shows that RA-games satisfy some specific concavity
conditions.
Lemma 3.3.4. Let (N,E, d, r) ∈ RAN with corresponding RA-game vR ∈
TUN . Let S, T, U ∈ 2N be such that S ⊂ T ⊂ N \U , U 6= ∅, and vR(S) > 0.
Then
vR(S ∪ U)− vR(S) ≥ vR(T ∪ U)− vR(T ). (3.7)
Proof. Let xT ∈ X(T,D(T )) and xT∪U ∈ X(T ∪U,D(T ∪U)). Since vR(S) >
0, we have D(S) > 0. Then
vR(S ∪ U)− vR(S)








































































































































































































































































































































































































































= v (T ∪ U,D(T ∪ U))− v (T,D(T ))
= vR(T ∪ U)− vR(T )
Equalities (1), (4), and (9) hold since D(S) > 0 respectively implies
D(S ∪ U) = D(S) +
∑





and D(T ) = D(S) +
∑
j∈T\S dj. Inequalities (2) and (8) follow by the fact
that the maximum value decreases if an extra condition is involved in the
optimization. Inequality (3) holds by Lemma 3.2.1. Equality (5) holds by




j . Equalities (6) and (7) follow from
Proposition 3.2.3.
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Example 3.3.1. Reconsider the RA-problem of Example 3.2.1. The
corresponding values of D(S), X(S,D(S)) and vR(S) are given in the table
below.
S 1 2 3 4
D(S) 0 1 2 0
xS ∈ X(S,D(S)) (0) (1) (2) (0)
vR(S) 0 5 4 0
S 1,2 1,3 1,4 2,3 2,4 3,4
D(S) 2 3 0 5 2 3





vR(S) 14 13 0 131
4
8 5
S 1,2,3 1,2,4 1,3,4 2,3,4 N
D(S) 6 3 4 6 7



















Lemma 3.3.4 tells us that, e.g. v({2, 4})− v({2}) ≥ v(N)− v({1, 2, 3}).
From v({1, 4}) − v({4}) < v(N) − v({2, 3, 4}), it follows that if v(S) = 0,
inequality (3.7) may be violated. ♦
Now we derive an explicit expression for the nucleolus (cf. Schmeidler
(1969)) of RA-games. For this we use some properties of bankruptcy problems
and associated bankruptcy games. A bankruptcy problem is a triple (N,B, c),
where N represents a finite set of agents, B ≥ 0 is the estate which has to
be divided among the agents, and c ∈ [0,∞)N is a vector of claims, where
for i ∈ N , ci represents agent i’s claim on the estate such that
∑
j∈N cj ≥ B.
For the associated bankruptcy (BR) game vB,c the value of a coalition S is
determined by the amount of B that is not claimed by agents in N \ S.













Recall (cf. Aumann and Maschler (1985)) that the nucleolus n(vE,d) of a
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bankruptcy game vE,d ∈ TU




























CEA(Ẽ, d̃) = (min{λ, d̃i})i∈N
with λ such that
∑
j∈N min{λ, d̃j} = Ẽ.
It turns out that the nucleolus of an RA-game coincides with the nucleolus
of an associated bankruptcy game.
Theorem 3.3.5. Let (N,E, d, r) ∈ RAN and let vR be the corresponding
RA-game. Then
n(vR) = n(vB,c)






Proof. Note that (N,B, c) is a BR-problem since vR(N) ≥ 0, and C(vR) 6= ∅,













j∈N yj = v
R(N) = B.
Next we show that C(vR) = C(vB,c). Clearly, v
R(N) = B = vB,c(N).
First we will prove that C(vB,c) ⊂ C(v
R) by showing that for all S ∈
2N , vR(S) ≤ vB,c(S). Let S ∈ 2
N and let N \ S = {i1, . . . , i|N\S|}. With-
out loss of generality we can assume that vR(S) > 0. This implies that
D(S) > 0 and, consequently, D(N \ {i1}) > 0, D(N \ {i1, i2}) > 0, . . . ,
D(N \{i1, . . . , iN\S}) > 0. Furthermore, v
R(N \{i1}) > 0, v
R(N \{i1, i2}) >
0, . . . , vR(N \ {i1, . . . , iN\S}) > 0. For all k ∈ {0, . . . , |N \ S| − 1} we have
by Lemma 3.3.4 that
vR(N \ {i1, . . . , ik})− v
R(N \ {i1, . . . , ik+1}) ≥ v
R(N)− vR(N \ {ik+1}).






vR(N \ {i1, . . . , ik})− v































Secondly, in order to prove that C(vR) ⊂ C(vB,c), let y ∈ C(v
R) and





















j∈S yj ≥ vB,c(S). It follows that y ∈ C(vB,c).
Potters and Tijs (1994) proved that for any two games v, w ∈ TUN with
C(v) = C(w) and w convex, we have n(v) = n(w). From the fact the
vB,c is a BR-game, that BR-games are convex (Curiel et al. (1987)), and
C(vR) = C(vB,c) we conclude that
n(vR) = n(vB,c).
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In the RA-problems of Chapter 3 now agents are characterized by a concave
reward function rather than a linear reward function, as in Chapter 2. In fact,
since linear functions fall within the class of concave functions, the model in
Chapter 3 is a generalization of the model in Chapter 2.
RA-problems such as described in Chapter 2 are close to the existing
model of BR-problems: agents are not only characterized by a claim, but
also by a linear reward function. Therefore, an explicit comparison is made
between properties of RA-games and BR-games. In Chapter 3 we consider
concave reward functions in order to make RA-problems as such more con-
sistent to problems in an economic setting. With respect to the results, the
model of Chapter 2 allows for an explicit formula of the maximum total joint






“Water is essential to life.” This statement is often used as an opening sen-
tence of papers relating to water management, in order to highlight the im-
portance of this field of research. Sustainable exploitation of common-pool
resources such as water requires cooperation among users (Ostrom et al.
(1994)). However, managing water resource systems usually involves con-
flicts arising from social and political aspects, but also creates conflicts over
sharing costs or benefits. These conflicts are mainly caused by asymmetric
dependence on a water resource. Issues of water management involve allo-
cation of water resources, groundwater management, water quality manage-
ment, transboundary water disputes, and using water in electricity generation
or irrigation. In practice, agents coordinate water extraction through vari-
ous arrangements. They specify the assignment of water and compensation
through monetary transfers (Ostrom et al. (1994) and Dinar (2007)).
This chapter deals with a simple example of a transboundary water con-
flict where an upstream user could withdraw such a large amount of wa-
ter that downstream users are no longer able to withdraw their preferred
amounts. In literature, this is known as the river sharing problem (Ambec
and Sprumont (2002)). The river sharing problem deals with the fair distri-
bution of the total welfare resulting from the optimal assignment of water
among a set of agents along the river.
In order to tackle the river sharing problem, global institutes such as the
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United Nations, came up with several multilateral agreements between states
sharing a water resource. Two common principles for river sharing are ab-
solute territorial sovereignty (ATS) and unlimited territorial integrity (UTI)
(Salman (2007)). The ATS principle implies that a state could do whatever
it wants with the inflow on its territory, irrespective to the harmful conse-
quences this might have to downstream states. At the other end, the UTI
principle states that the use of water resources within a state is permitted
only in so far it does not cause damage or injury in the territory of other
states. The principle of Territorial Integration of all Basin States (TIBS)
combines both (extreme) principles by considering the problem in terms of
benefits, rather than water. The TIBS principle requires the full sharing of
both the benefits and costs of the management of an international water-
course such that it can be summarized in three steps: (1) the water rights
over an international watercourse belong to all basin states combined, (2) the
basin states are obliged to put the water from the international watercourse
to its most productive use, and (3) each basin state has a right to a reasonable
and equitable share of the benefit (wealth) that results from the optimal use
of the water from the international watercourse. Observe that it is crucial
for the implementation of the TIBS principle that the countries sharing a
river have the possibility to make monetary transfers to each other. For an
extended overview of the highlights in the law of international watercourses
in the past century and the TIBS principle, we refer to Moes (2013).
For the river sharing problem Ambec and Sprumont (2002) introduce a
model in which a group of agents is located along a single-stream river from
upstream to downstream. Each agent is assumed to have quasi-linear prefer-
ences over river water and money. The benefits of consuming an amount of
water are given by a strictly increasing, differentiable, and strictly concave
reward function where satiation points do not exist. An assignment of the
river water among the agents is called efficient when it maximizes the total
joint reward. To sustain such an efficient assignment, agents can compensate
each other by monetary transfers. This model has been tested in a realistic
setting e.g. for the Jordan River by Jägerskog (2007) and the Nile by Di-
nar and Nigatu (2013). Moreover, the model has been expanded by adding
more aspects. One of these aspects is allowing satiable agents (by Ambec
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and Ehlers (2008)) by the fact that overconsumption may cause flooding or
increase sanitation costs with higher water extraction costs. Another aspect
concerns the structure of the river. Khmelnitskaya (2010) considers rivers
that have a sink-tree or rooted-tree structure allowing multiple springs or
deltas. Van den Brink et al. (2012) combine the studies of rivers with mul-
tiple springs and satiable agents and suggest a new class of solutions based
on the TIBS principle. We refer to Beal et al. (2013), for a recent survey of
the river sharing problem.
Cooperative game theory has often been employed for analyzing river
sharing allocation problems. Game theory provides insight into the fair allo-
cation of the jointly generated maximal total joint reward of the utilization
of river water. Kilgour and Dinar (2001) and Ambec and Sprumont (2002)
were the first to model the river sharing problem as a cooperative TU-game
on the set of participating agents. Ambec and Sprumont (2002) propose the
downstream incremental solution, that is, the marginal vector of the game
with the players ordered from upstream to downstream, as a solution to the
problem of allocating the maximal total joint reward. For the purpose of
climate change, Ambec and Dinar (2009) examine the robustness of such
solutions to reduced water flow. Other solution concepts are upstream in-
cremental solution, that is, the marginal vector of the game with players
ordered from downstream to upstream, and the combination of both up- and
downstream incremental solution (Van den Brink et al. (2007)), Harsanyi so-
lutions (Van den Brink et al. (2003)), component efficient solutions (Van den
Brink et al. (2007)), and the average tree solution (Herings et al. (2008)).
Wang (2011) proposes a solution in which water trading is restricted to pairs
of neighboring agents. Van den Brink et al. (2014) introduce a number of
axioms to characterize these solutions. Parrachino et al. (2006) provide a
review of various applications of cooperative game theory to issues of water
resources.
In this chapter we modify the model of Ambec and Sprumont (2002) in
the following way. We describe a single-stream river along which a number of
agents are situated, each with a justified claim on the water. For each agent
this demand is greater than or equal to the inflow on his territory. Moreover,
each agent is characterized by a strictly increasing, differentiable, and con-
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cave reward function which describes the reward per unit of assigned water.
Unlike the model of Ambec and Sprumont (2002) we incorporate satiation
points by allowing each agent to extract water at most up to his demand.
As the TIBS principle prescribes, we consider the assignments of water such
that the total joint reward is maximized. We characterize optimal assign-
ments of water for the group as a whole by means of the derivatives of the
reward functions and present a methodology to determine such an assign-
ment. Herein downstream transfer of water is possible, upstream transfer is
not. For the corresponding river sharing allocation game, a coalition of play-
ers can distribute water assuming that players outside the coalition act in
an individualistic way. Within a coalition, water can be distributed, taking
into account that all in-between individualists, if possible, will extract water
up to their demand. We show that the downstream incremental solution is
in the core of the corresponding river sharing allocation game. We finish the
chapter by presenting a solution that is directly based on the methodology
to determine an optimal assignment of water.
This chapter is organized as follows. In Section 4.2 the formal model
of river sharing allocation problems is provided and optimal assignments of
water are characterized. In Section 4.3 we introduce corresponding river
sharing allocation games and show the existence of stable allocations.
4.2 River Sharing Allocation Problems
This section formally introduces river sharing allocation (RSA) problems.
After introducing the model, optimal assignments of water, in which the
total joint reward is maximized, are characterized.
In an RSA-problem (N, e, d, r), N = {1, ..., n} represents the set of agents
on the river, numbered successively from upstream to downstream. Let e ∈
RN+ is the vector of amounts of inflow of water. Here, ei is the flow of water
entering the river between agents i − 1 and i, with e1 the inflow before the
most upstream agent 1. Agent i can extract water up to his demand di, where
d = (di)i∈N ∈ R
N
+ is the corresponding vector of demands. Subtracting
a higher amount of water is assumed to be infeasible. Furthermore, for
each agent i ∈ N there exists a reward function ri on [0, di] describing the
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monetary gain to agent i from assigned water: for every z ∈ [0, di], ri(z)
denotes the reward for agent i if he is assigned z units of water. In this chapter
it is assumed that for every i ∈ N, ri is a strictly increasing, differentiable,
and concave reward function on [0, di] with ri(0) = 0. The class of RSA-
problems with set of agents N is denoted by RSAN .
The agents’ objective is to maximize the total joint monetary reward of
water use and they may increase these joint rewards by transferring water
to others. Here, upstream agents may transfer their water to downstream
agents. Water cannot be transported upstream.
We assume water scarcity by taking ei ≤ di for all i ∈ N . In fact this
can be done without loss of generality (cf. Ambec and Ehlers (2008)). Sup-
pose (N, e, d, r) is such that there exist an agent i ∈ N where ei > di.
By assumption it holds that agent i will never extract more water than di,
and i will always transfer at least ei − di. Now define (N, ê, d, r), where
êi = di, êi+1 = ei+1 + (ei − di), and for all j ∈ N \ {i, i + 1}, êj = ej
1. Now,
the analysis of (N, e, d, r) and (N, ê, d, r) coincide.
Let F (N, e, d, r) be the set containing all efficient assignments such that
for all i ∈ N the sum of assigned water of all upstream agents of i (including
i) does not exceed the available water (the total inflow of these upstream
agents), the amount of assigned water is non-negative, and does not exceed
demand di. Hence,




















ej and xi ∈ [0, di] for all i ∈ N
}
.
Throughout this chapter, feasible assignments of water which maximize
the total joint reward are considered. In the remainder of this chapter we
refer to these assignments as optimal assignments.
Let (N, e, d, r) ∈ RSAN . The maximum total joint reward v(N, e, d, r) is
1If i = n, then we set ê = ((ej)j∈N\{n}, dn), i.e. the amount (en − dn) is not extracted
by any agent.
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determined by









x ∈ F (N, e, d, r)
}
.
Note that this maximum exists due to the fact that
∑
j∈N rj is continuous
on a compact domain. The set X(N, e, d, r) of optimal assignments is given
by
X(N, e, d, r) =
{







rj(xj) = v(N, e, d, r)
}
.
Let Ei(x) be the inflow of agent i ∈ N for a feasible assignment x ∈
F (N, e, d, r), i.e.




(ej − xj) .
Let P (x) be the set of agents extracting all inflow entering their territory
with respect to assignment x, i.e.
P (x) = {p ∈ N |xp = Ep(x)}.
Without loss of generality, take P (x) = {p1, . . . , pm(x)}, with p1 < p2 <
· · · < pm(x). Observe that by efficiency holds that pm(x) = n. Define the
partition N = {N1(x), . . . , Nm(x)(x)}, referred to as the x-partition, such




This implies that subsequent agents with a positive flow of water in-between
are in the same element of the partition and the most downstream agent in
a partition extracts all inflow, hence, is in P (x).
The conditions in Theorem 4.2.1 consider the derivative r′i(z) for each
i ∈ N . This derivative reflects the marginal contribution of an agent for extra
assigned water. We provide the intuition behind the formal characterization
of an optimal assignment in Theorem 4.2.1. An optimal assignment x leads
to a partition of N . Within an element of such partition, the marginal
contributions of agents coincide if both agents are assigned a positive amount
of water which is lower than their demand. Indeed, if for such assignment
the marginalities would not be equal, the joint reward can be increased by
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transferring water between players that have different marginalities. Agents
who are assigned their demand have a marginal contribution greater than or
equal to the other agents, since feasibility does not allow for any more water
to be assigned. Vice versa, agents without assigned water have a marginal
contribution lower than or equal to the other agents, since such agents are
not able to transfer any water to others. Note that condition (1) implies
for an optimal assignment x ∈ X(N, e, d, r), that for two agents in the same
partition, i.e. i, k ∈ Nl(x) with l ∈ {1, . . . , m(x)}, xi ∈ (0, di) and xk ∈ (0, dk)
it holds that r′i(xi) = r
′
k(xk). For two agents i, k in two different partitions
where agent i is upstream of k, the marginal contribution of k is lower than
or equal to the marginal contribution of i. If not, using a similar argument
as inside one partition element, transferring water from agent i to k increases
the total joint reward which contradicts the optimality.
Theorem 4.2.1. Let (N, e, d, r) ∈ RSAN and x ∈ F (N, e, d, r). Then x ∈
X(N, e, d, r) if and only if the following two conditions are satisfied
(1) r′i(xi) ≥ r
′
k(xk) for all i, k ∈ Nl(x) with l ∈ {1, . . . , m(x)} such that
xi ∈ (0, di] and xk ∈ [0, dk), and
(2) r′i(xi) ≥ r
′
k(xk) for all i, k ∈ N such that i < k, xi ∈ (0, di] and xk ∈
[0, dk).
2
Proof. We first prove the “only if” part. Let x ∈ X(N, e, d, r). We prove






Suppose (2) is violated for i, k ∈ N where i < k, xi ∈ (0, di], xk ∈ [0, dk)
such that r′i(xi) < r
′
k(xk). This implies that there exists a δ > 0 such that for
all ǫ ∈ (0, δ) it holds that rk(xk + ǫ) + ri(xi − ǫ) > rk(xk) + ri(xi). From the
fact that i is upstream of k it follows that there exists an ǫ ∈ (0, δ) such that
x̂ ∈ F (N, e, d, r), where x̂ is such that x̂j = xj for all j ∈ N\{i, k}, x̂k = xk+ǫ,
2The conditions in Theorem 3.2.2 implies the necessary conditions that follow from the
Kuhn-Tucker Theorem (Kuhn and Tucker (1951)) for an assignment to be optimal.
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Hence, x /∈ X(N, e, d, r) which establishes a contradiction.
Now suppose (1) is violated for Nl(x) with l ∈ {1, . . . , m(x)}. Then there
exists a pair of agents i, k ∈ Nl(x) with xi ∈ (0, di], xk ∈ [0, dk) such that
r′i(xi) < r
′
k(xk). This tells us that there exists a δ > 0 such that for all
ǫ ∈ (0, δ) it holds that rk(xk + ǫ)+ ri(xi− ǫ) > rk(xk)+ ri(xi). From the fact
that i and k both are in Nl(x), and there is a positive flow in-between agents
in Nl(x) (i.e. for all j ∈ N such that min{i, k} < j < max{i, k} it holds that
xj < Ej(x)), there exists a feasible solution where water is transferred from
agent i to k. Hence, there exists an ǫ ∈ (0, δ) such that x̂ ∈ F (N, e, d, r),
where x̂ is such that x̂j = xj for all j ∈ N \{i, k}, x̂k = xk+ǫ, and x̂i = xi−ǫ.
Similar to (4.1) - (4.4) it follows that x̂ /∈ X(N, e, d, r) which establishes a
contradiction.
For the “if” part, let x ∈ F (N, e, d, r), x /∈ X(N, e, d, r), and xN ∈
X(N, e, d, r). Clearly, the sets A1 = {j ∈ N |x
N
j > xj}, and A2 = {j ∈
N |xNj < xj} both are non-empty. Note that for all i ∈ A1, xi < di and
xNi > 0. Vice versa, it holds for all k ∈ A2 that x
N
k < dk and xk > 0. From
concavity it follows that
r′i(x
N
i ) ≤ r
′
i(xi) for all i ∈ A1, and (4.5)
r′k(x
N
k ) ≥ r
′
k(xk) for all k ∈ A2. (4.6)




i ) = r
′
i(xi), and for all k ∈ A2
that r′k(x
N
k ) = r
′
k(xk). By the fact that r is a strictly increasing and con-
cave function it holds that for all i ∈ A1, ri is linear on [xi, x
N
i ] and for
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all k ∈ A2, rk is linear on [x
N
k , xk]. This can be verified using a simi-







j ) and hence x ∈ X(N, e, d, r). This es-
tablishes a contradiction such that for at least one agent i ∈ A1 it holds that
r′i(x
N
i ) < r
′




k ) > r
′
k(xk).
Let {N1(x), . . . , Nm(x)(x)} be the x-partition and let {N1(x
N), . . . ,
Nm(xN )(x
N )} be the xN -partition. Since, x and xN do not coincide, these
partitions could be different. The x-partition is outlined in Figure 4.1. Let
i ∈ A1 be such that i ∈ Nl(x), i ∈ Nl̂(x
N ) and r′i(x
N
i ) < r
′
i(xi). Since
xN ∈ X(N, e, d, r) we know from the “only-if” part of the proof that assign-




{j ∈ Nl(x)|j > i}
0 >0 >0 >0 >0 0
Figure 4.1: Agent i ∈ Nl(x) in the x-partition.
First, assume {j ∈ Nl(x)∩A2|j > i} 6= ∅ and let k ∈ {j ∈ Nl(x)∩A2|j >
i}. From the “only-if” part of the proof we know by (2), i < k, xNi > 0, and

















k ) ≥ r
′
k(xk).
Hence, r′i(xi) > r
′
k(xk) which violates (1) by i, k ∈ Nl(x), xi < di, and xk > 0.














Here, the equality follows from definition of Nl(x), the inequality from feasi-
bility of xN . Since xNi > xi, there exists at least one agent k ≤ max(Nl(x))
3For simplicity, for a set of agents A ⊂ N , we write max(A) rather than max{i ∈ N |i ∈
A} and min(A) rather than min{i ∈ N |i ∈ A}, in order to describe, respectively, the most
downstream and most upstream agent in A.
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such that xNk < xk (i.e. k ∈ A2). Let k = max{j ∈ A2|j ≤ max(Nl(x))},
i.e. k is the most downstream agent in A2, which is upstream of max(Nl(x)).
From the fact that {j ∈ Nl(x) ∩ A2|j > i} = ∅ it follows that k < i.
Now we show that k ∈ Nl̂(x
N ). Suppose k /∈ Nl̂(x
N ). By the fact that
k < i, i ∈ Nl̂(x
N ), k /∈ Nl̂(x
N), and k = max{j ∈ A2|j ≤ max(Nl(x))} it
follows that there is no agent j ∈ A2 (i.e. xj > x
N
j ) such that min(Nl̂(x
N)) ≤
j ≤ max(Nl(x)). By x
N















































































The first and third equality holds by definition, the first inequality by (4.7),
and the second inequality by feasibility of x. Hence, k ∈ Nl̂(x
N ). From the
“only-if” part of the proof we know by (1) that since xNi > 0 and x
N
k < dk it
holds that r′i(x
N




















k ) ≥ r
′
k(xk).
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Hence, r′i(xi) > r
′
k(xk). Since k < i, xk > 0, and xi < di this violates (2).




i ) = r
′
i(xi), but there




k ) > r
′
k(xk). Then again, either (1) or
(2) is violated.
Example 4.2.1 shows how Theorem 4.2.1 can be used to check the opti-
mality of an assignment x.
Example 4.2.1. Let (N, e, d, r) ∈ RSAN with N = {1, . . . , 8} and assign-
ment x ∈ RN as described in Figure 4.2 and Table 4.1. In Figure 4.2 the
structure of the river is outlined by means of a direct graph. Here, a node
refers to an agent i and its demand di (denoted by i : di), the incoming arc
refers to the inflow ei on the territory of the agent, the outgoing arc denotes
the assigned water xi, and the arcs in-between agents outlines the transfer
from the upstream to the downstream agent (i.e.
∑i−1
j=1(ej −xj)). For exam-
ple, agent 5 has an inflow of e5 = 2, demand d5 = 3 and is assigned x5 = 1.
The total inflow upstream of agent 5 equals 12, of which 2 is assigned to
agents in {1, . . . , 4}. Hereby, 10 units of water is transferred to agent 5. The
reward functions for all agents are outlined in Table 4.1.
1:5 2:2 3:6 4:3 5:3 6:7.5 7:1 8:8.5
2 3 8 10 11 8.5 8.5
2 0 0 0 1 4 1 8.5
4 1 5 2 2 1.5 1 0
Figure 4.2: The inflows, demands and assignment x for the RSA-problem of
Example 4.2.1
Feasibility can be verified from Figure 4.2 as follows. First, efficiency
holds by the fact that agent 8 is assigned his inflow (of 0) and transfer from
upstream agents (of 8.5). Secondly, since all in-between arc are non-negative,
the sum of assigned water does not exceeds the available water. At last, each
agent is assigned a non-negative amount of water which does not exceed its
demand.
Now we use the conditions (1) and (2) of Theorem 4.2.1 in order to
check optimality of the assignment x. Clearly, P (x) = {8}, m(x) = 1, and
N1(x) = N . This can be observed from Figure 4.2 by the fact that there is
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Agent ri(z) xi r
′
i(xi)
1 12z − z2 2 8
2 8z − z2 0 8
3 2z − 1
6
z2 0 2
4 4z − 2
3
z2 0 4
5 12z − 2z2 1 8
6 12z − 1
2
z2 4 8
7 13z − z2 1 11
8 10z 8.5 10
Table 4.1: The reward functions r(z), and the derivative r′(x) for assignment
x for the 8-person RSA problem Example 4.2.1
no arc in-between agents with 0 transfer. Now, condition (1) implies (2) such
that, in order to check optimality of x, it suffices to check condition (1) for
all pairs of agents in N . For this, we check for r′i(xi) ≥ r
′
k(xk) where i, k ∈ N
is such that
1. xi = di and xk ∈ [0, dk), or
2. xi ∈ (0, di] and xk = 0, or
3. xi ∈ (0, di) and xk ∈ (0, dk).
1. Note that {i ∈ N |xi = di} = {7, 8} where r
′
7(x7) = 11 and r
′
8(x8) = 10.
Since r′k(xk) ≤ 8 for all k ∈ N \ {7, 8}, it is readily verified that condition
(1) holds.
2. Now {k ∈ N |xk = 0} = {2, 3, 4} with r
′
2(x2) = 8, r
′
3(x3) = 2, and
r′4(x4) = 4. Condition (1) follows from the fact that r
′
i(xi) ≥ 8 for all
i ∈ N \ {2, 3, 4}.





r′6(x6) = 8 which satisfies condition (1) such that x ∈ X(N, e, d, r). ♦
Corollary 4.2.2 follows from the fact that for each l ∈ {1, . . . , m(x)}, the
most downstream agent in Nl(x), extracts all water such that there is no flow
in-between agents in different sets of an x-partition:
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Corollary 4.2.2. Let (N, e, d, r) ∈ RSAN , x ∈ X(N, e, d, r) and {N1(x), . . . ,
Nm(x)(x)} be the corresponding x-partition. Then
4




v(Nl(x), e|Nl(x), d|Nl(x), r|Nl(x)).
Theorem 4.2.1 characterizes optimal assignments. We now present a
methodology to systematically determine an optimal assignment. We first
discuss the general structure of this methodology, and then this method is
illustrated in Example 4.2.2.
Methodology 4.2.3.
Input: (N, e, d, r) ∈ RSAN
Output: x ∈ X(N, e, d, r)
Step 1. Initialize xj = ej for all j ∈ N , and i = 2.




i(xi)} = ∅, then go to
Step 7.




i(xi)} 6= ∅, then go to
Step 3.





Step 4. Define K = {j ∈ H|r′j(xj) = min{r
′
h(xh)|h ∈ H}}





s.t. r′k(xk − ǫk) = r
′
j(xj − ǫj) for all k, j ∈ K (4.8)
r′k(xk − ǫk) ≤ min{r
′
j(xj)|j ∈ H \K} for all k ∈ K (4.9)





ǫk) for all k ∈ K (4.10)
Step 6. Update x by xk := xk − ǫk for all k ∈ K, and xi := xi +
∑
k∈K ǫk.
Next, return to Step 2.
4e|S ∈ RS denotes the restricted vector of inflows for agents in S ⊂ N with respect to
e ∈ RN ; r|S refers to {rj(z)}j∈S
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Step 7. If i = |N |, then stop.
If i < |N |, then let i := i+ 1. Next, return to Step 2.
In each step of Methodology 4.2.3, an optimal assignment is determined
for the set of upstream agents up to agent i. However, for some agents, Step
2 - Step 6 are repeated a finite number of times. This is illustrated in the
Example 4.2.2. Although there always is an {ǫk}k∈K such that conditions
(4.8)-(4.10) are satisfied, the complexity of maximizing
∑
k∈K ǫk depends on
the complexity of the reward functions. For Example 4.2.2 we use SOLVER
on MS-Excel, in order to obtain {ǫk}k∈K.
Example 4.2.2. Reconsider Example 4.2.1 with N = {1, . . . , 8} as de-
scribed in Figure 4.2 and Table 4.1. The assignment of water is not yet
determined.
Methodology 4.2.3 sequentially determines an optimal assignment for
agents in {1, . . . , i} for increasing i. Table 4.2 outlines these assignments
xi ∈ RN . Here (xij)j≤i refers to the optimal assignment for agents in {1, . . . , i}
obtained by Methodology 4.2.3, i.e. (xij)j≤i ∈ X({1, . . . , i}, e|{1,...,i}, d|{1,...,i},
r|{1,...,i}) (for simplicity written as X({1, . . . , i})), and x
i
j = ej for all j > i.
1:5 2:2 3:6 4:3 5:3 6:7.5 7:1 8:8.5
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
4 1 5 2 2 1.5 1 0
4 1 5 2 2 1.5 1 0
Figure 4.3: Initial assignment x = e for the RSA-problem in Example 4.2.2
Step 1. Initially, all agents obtain their inflow, such that x = e =
(4, 1, 5, 2, 2, 1.5, 1, 0) and no water is transferred. This assignment is out-
lined in Figure 4.3. Let i = 2.
Step 2 (i=2). Now x2 = 1 < d2 such that agent 2 is not yet satisfied.




2(x2)} = {1}, which yields
that agent 1 is assigned a positive amount of water and the marginal contri-
bution of agent 1 (derivative of the reward function of agent 1 in the current
assignment) is lower than the marginal contribution of agent 2. Hence, there
exists a feasible transfer from agent 1 to agent 2, which increases the total
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joint reward. In order to determine the amount of water transfer, we continue
considering Step 3.





Step 4 (i=2). Let K be the subset of H containing all agents with the
lowest derivative of all agents in H . Clearly, H = K.
Step 5 (i=2). Now determine the amount of water transfer by solving the
following maximization problem.
max ǫ1
s.t. r′1(x1 − ǫ1) ≤ r
′
2(x2 + ǫ1)
Recall that by |H| = 1, equality (4.8) and inequality (4.9) do not apply. For
ǫ1 = 0.5 it holds that r
′




2(x2 + ǫ1) = r
′
2(1.5) = 5.
Hence, transferring 0.5 from agent 1 to agent 2 leads to an assignment in
which the marginal contribution of agent 1 and 2 coincide.
Step 6 (i=2). Let x be such that x1 := x1 − ǫ1 = 3.5 and x2 := x2 + ǫ1 =
1.5. Next, return to Step 2.




2(x2)} = ∅. Trans-
ferring more water (if feasible) from agent 1 to agent 2 will not increase the
total joint reward and therefore we go to Step 7. Since this finishes the opti-
mization for set of agents {1, 2}, assignment (x21, x
2
2) ∈ X({1, 2}) is displayed
in Table 4.2. Optimality is checked by Theorem 4.2.1.
Step 7 (i=2). Let i = 3.




3(x3)} = ∅, it holds
that there does not exists an agent upstream of agent 3 with a marginal
contribution for the current assignment lower than the marginal contribution
of agent 3. Hereby, no water is transferred to agent 3. Consequently, we go
to Step 7, x2 = x3 and {x3j}j≤3 ∈ X({1, 2, 3}) and can be found in Table 4.2.
Step 7 (i=3). Let i = 4.
Step 2 (i=4). By x4 = 2 < d4 = 3 and {j ∈ N |j < 4, xj > 0, r
′
j(xj) <
r′4(x4)} = {3}, we consider transferring water from agent 3 to agent 4.
Step 3-4 (i=4). Define H = K = {3}.
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Step 5 (i=4). Solving the following maximization problem determines the
transfer from agent 3 to 4.
max ǫ3
s.t. r′3(x3 − ǫ3) ≤ r
′
4(x4 + ǫ3)





Step 6 (i=4). Let x be such that {xj}j≤4 = (3.5, 1.5, 4.4, 2.6). Next,
return to Step 2.




4(x4)} = ∅, it follows
that there does not exist a feasible transfer to agent 4 which increases the
total joint reward. Therefore, we go to Step 7 and {x4j}j≤4 ∈ X({1, . . . , 4})
can be found in Table 4.2.
Step 7 (i=4). Let i = 5.
Step 2 (i=5). By x5 < d5 and {j ∈ N |j < 5, x
j > 0, r′j(xj) < r
′
5(x5)} =
{3, 4}, it holds that agent 5 is not yet satisfied, and agent 3 and 4 both are
currently assigned a positive amount of water and have a marginal contri-
bution lower than agent 5. Therefore, we consider transferring water from
these agents to agent 5.
Step 3 (i=5). Define H = {3, 4}.
Step 4 (i=5). Since, r′3(x3) = r
′
4(x4), it holds that H = K = {3, 4}.
Now agents 3 and 4 simultaneously transfer water to agent 5, such that their
derivatives remain mutually equal (by inequality (4.8)).
Step 5-6 (i=5). Determine ǫ ∈ RK where
max ǫ3 + ǫ4
s.t. r′3(x3 − ǫ3) = r
′
4(x4 − ǫ4)
r′3(x3 − ǫ3) ≤ r
′
5(x5 + ǫ3 + ǫ4)
r′4(x4 − ǫ4) ≤ r
′
























) and return to Step 2.




5(x5)} = ∅, we go to
Step 7. Now, {x5j}j≤5 ∈ X({1, . . . , 5}) can be found in Table 4.2.
Step 7 (i=5). Let i = 6.
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Step 2 (i=6). Now, x6 = 1.5 < d6 = 7.5 and {j ∈ N |j < 6, xj >
0, r′j(xj) < r
′
6(x6)} = {1, . . . , 5}. Consequently, we consider Step 3.
Step 3 (i=6). Define H = {1, . . . , 5}.
Step 4 (i=6). Let K be the subset of H containing all agents with the
lowest derivative of all agents in H . Since r′1(x1) = r
′





5(x5) = 0.75, it holds that K = {3, 4, 5}. Hence, although agents
1 and 2 both have a marginal contribution lower than agent 6, we first only
consider the transfer of agents 3, 4 and 5, since their derivatives are even
lower. These agents simultaneously transfer water to agent 6.
Step 5-6 (i=6). Now
max ǫ3 + ǫ4 + ǫ5
s.t. r′3(x3 − ǫ3) = r
′
4(x4 − ǫ4) = r
′
5(x5 − ǫ5)
r′3(x3 − ǫ3) ≤ min{r
′
j(xj)|j ∈ {1, 2}} = 5
r′4(x4 − ǫ4) ≤ 5
r′5(x5 − ǫ5) ≤ 5
r′3(x3 − ǫ3) ≤ r
′
6(x6 + ǫ3 + ǫ4 + ǫ5)
r′4(x4 − ǫ4) ≤ r
′
6(x6 + ǫ3 + ǫ4 + ǫ5)
r′5(x5 − ǫ5) ≤ r
′
6(x6 + ǫ3 + ǫ4 + ǫ5)






, and ǫ5 =
5
16





2 < r′6(6.5) = 5.5. Note that agent 3 runs out of water, such that transferring
more water to agent 6 violates equality (4.8). Now let x such that {xj}j≤6 =
(3.5, 1.5, 0, 1.5, 2.5, 6.5)5 and return to Step 2.





∅. Since agent 6 is not yet satisfied and there still are upstream agents with
a positive amount of assigned water and a marginal contribution lower than
agent 6, we again consider transferring water to agent 6.
Step 3-5 (i=6). Define H = {1, 2, 4, 5} and K = {4, 5}. Hence, this
involves another set of upstream agents where agent 3 is deleted from previous
5Note that x is an intermediate assignment to go from x5 to x6 and is not optimal for
{1, . . . , 5}
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set K by x3 = 0. Now
max ǫ4 + ǫ5
s.t. r′4(x4 − ǫ4) = r
′
5(x5 − ǫ5)
r′4(x4 − ǫ4) ≤ 5
r′5(x5 − ǫ5) ≤ 5
r′4(x4 − ǫ4) ≤ r
′
6(x6 + ǫ4 + ǫ5)
r′5(x5 − ǫ5) ≤ r
′
6(x6 + ǫ4 + ǫ5)




5(2.25) = 3 < r
′
6(7.5) =
4.5. Now, inequality (4.10) in binding since assigning more than 7.5 to agent
6 is infeasible by demand d6.
Step 6 (i=6). Let x such that {xj}j≤6 = (3.5, 1.5, 0, 0.75, 2.25, 7.5) and
return to Step 2.
Step 2 (i=6). Now x6 = 7.5 = d6 tells us that agent 6 is totally satisfied.
Hereby, transferring more water to this agent is infeasible. Hence, we go to
Step 7 and assignment, {x6j}j≤6 ∈ X({1, . . . , 6}) is found in Table 4.2.
Step 7 (i=6). Let i = 7.
Step 2 (i=7). By x7 = d7 it holds that agent 7 is already satisfied and
there is no feasible transfer of water to agent 7. Hereby, we go to Step 7. As
displayed in Table 4.2, x6 = x7 and {x7j}j≤7 ∈ X({1, . . . , 7}).
Step 7 (i=7). Let i = 8.





{1, 2, 4, 5, 6}. Consequently, we go to Step 3.
Step 3-6 (i=8). Define H = {1, 2, 4, 5, 6} and K = {4, 5}. Now
max ǫ4 + ǫ5
s.t. r′4(x4 − ǫ4) = r
′
5(x5 − ǫ5)
r′4(x4 − ǫ4) ≤ min{r
′
j(xj)|j ∈ {1, 2, 6}} = 4.5
r′5(x5 − ǫ5) ≤ 4.5
r′4(x4 − ǫ4) ≤ r
′
8(x8 + ǫ4 + ǫ5)
r′5(x5 − ǫ5) ≤ r
′
8(x8 + ǫ4 + ǫ5)
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5(2) = 4 < r
′
8(1) = 10.
Note that agent 4 runs out of water. Let x := (3.5, 1.5, 0, 0, 2, 7.5, 1, 1) and
return to Step 2.





{1, 2, 5, 6}. Hence, we again consider Step 3.
Step 3-6 (i=8). Now, transferring water to agent 8 is considered for
H = {1, 2, 5, 6} and K = {5}. Then,
max ǫ5
s.t. r′5(x5 − ǫ5) ≤ min{r
′
j(xj)|j ∈ {1, 2, 6}} = 4.5






it holds that r′5(1
7
8
) = 4.5. Note that inequality (4.9) is binding.
Hence, in set H \K = {1, 2, 6} there are agents whose derivative is now equal
to the derivative of agent 5. Now, let x := (3.5, 1.5, 0, 0, 17
8
, 7.5, 1, 11
8
) and
return to Step 2.





{1, 2, 5, 6} such that again the transfer to agent 8 is considered.
Step 3-6 (i=8). Define H = {1, 2, 5, 6} and K = {5, 6}. The derivatives
of agent 5 and 6 coincides such that agent 6 is added to set K. Then,
max ǫ5 + ǫ6
s.t. r′5(x5 − ǫ5) = r
′
6(x6 − ǫ6)
r′5(x5 − ǫ5) ≤ min{r
′
j(xj)|j ∈ {1, 2}} = 5
r′6(x6 − ǫ6) ≤ 5
r′5(x5 − ǫ5) ≤ r
′
8(x8 + ǫ5 + ǫ6)
r′6(x6 − ǫ6) ≤ r
′








6(7) = 5. Now x :=
(3.5, 1.5, 0, 0, 1.75, 7, 1, 1.75) and return to Step 2.





{1, 2, 5, 6}, it follows that we again should determine the set of agents for
which transferring water to agent 8 is beneficial.
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Step 3-6 (i=8). Define H = K = {1, 2, 5, 6}. Hence, agents 1 and 2 are
added to set K. Then,
max ǫ1 + ǫ2 + ǫ5 + ǫ6
s.t. r′1(x1 − ǫ1) = r
′
2(x2 − ǫ2) = r
′
5(x5 − ǫ5) = r
′
6(x6 − ǫ6)
r′1(x1 − ǫ1) ≤ r
′
8(x8 + ǫ1 + ǫ2 + ǫ5 + ǫ6)
r′2(x2 − ǫ2) ≤ r
′
8(x8 + ǫ1 + ǫ2 + ǫ5 + ǫ6)
r′5(x5 − ǫ5) ≤ r
′
8(x8 + ǫ1 + ǫ2 + ǫ5 + ǫ6)
r′6(x6 − ǫ6) ≤ r
′
8(x8 + ǫ1 + ǫ2 + ǫ5 + ǫ6)







6(4) = 8 and x8 = d8 = 8.5. Let x := (2, 0, 0, 0, 1, 4, 1, 8.5) and
return to Step 2.
Step 2 (i=8). By x8 = d8, it follows that there is no further transfer
possible to agent 8. Therefore, go to Step 7 and x8 = (2, 0, 0, 0, 1, 4, 1, 8.5) is
outlined in Table 4.2.
Step 7 (i=8). Now i = 8 = |N |, finishes the methodology of obtaining
assignment x = x8, outlined in Figure 4.2.
From Example 4.2.1 it follows that x ∈ X(N, e, d, r).































































7 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 81
2
Table 4.2: Assignments xi for Example 4.2.2 using Methodology 4.2.3
♦
Consider assignments xi and xi+1 for i ∈ N\{n} as in Example 4.2.2. The-
orem 4.2.1 allows us to check that xi is an optimal assignment for {1, . . . , i}
and xi+1 for {1, . . . , i + 1}. Table 4.2 shows that for each agent j < i the
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amount of assigned water xij decreases when downstream agents are added,
i.e. xij ≥ x
i+1
j .
4.3 River Sharing Allocation Games
Consider a coalition S ⊂ N of agents choosing their amount of extracted wa-
ter in order to maximize the total joint reward. They may transfer available
water to downstream coalition agents with a greater marginal contribution,
provided this is feasible. However, water to be transferred to downstream
coalition agents via the territory of an intermediate, non-coalition agent,
referred to as ‘individualist’, involves leakage because individualists are as-
sumed to act individualistic by extracting the amount of water in order to
maximize individual payoffs by using all available water up to their demand.
An assignment of water to agents in coalition S is referred to as xS ∈ RS.
Such assignment allows us to recursively determine the amount of water









































An assignment xS is called feasible for S if
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Inflow constraint (4.13) tells us that for each agent i ∈ S the amount of
assigned water is lower than or equal to the amount of available water. Ef-
ficiency constraint (4.14) states that the most downstream agent in S is
assigned all its inflow.
Let F S(N, e, d, r) denote the set of feasible assignments xS. The maxi-
mum total joint reward vS(N, e, d, r) for coalition S is determined by









x ∈ F S(N, e, d, r)
}
.
The set XS(N, e, d, r) of optimal assignments is given by
XS(N, e, d, r) =
{








S(N, e, d, r)
}
.
Now we introduce the class of river sharing allocation (RSA) games. A
transferable utility (TU) game is an ordered pair (N, v) where N is the finite
set of agents, and v the characteristic function on 2N , the set of all coalitions
of N . For the remainder we refer to N as the set of players instead of agents.
The function v assigns to every coalition S ∈ 2N a real number v(S) with
v(∅) = 0. Here, v(S) is called the worth or value of the coalition S. The
set of all TU-games with set of players N is denoted by TUN . Where no
confusion arises, we write v rather then (N, v).
Now consider an RSA-problem (N, e, d, r). In the RSA-game v, associated
to (N, e, d, r), we define the worth of coalition S as
v(S) = vS(N, e, d, r).
A coalition S is called connected if for all i, j ∈ S and k such that i < k < j
it holds that k ∈ S. Due to the fact that players in N \ S act individualistic
and di ≥ ei for all i ∈ N , players upstream of S do not transfer any water
to S. Due to feasibility, the most downstream agent in S extracts all water,
transferring nothing to downstream individualists. Consequently, we have
the following corollary.
Corollary 4.3.1. Let (N, e, d, r) ∈ RSAN , let v ∈ TUN be the corre-
sponding RSA-game, and let S ⊂ N be such that S is connected. Then,
(S, e|S, d|S, r|S) ∈ RSA
S and
v(S) = v(S, e|S, d|S, r|S).
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Now suppose S is not connected. Then S consists of p components such
that S =
⋃p
l=1 Sl, and for all l ∈ {1, . . . , p}, Sl is maximally connected and
max(Sl−1) < min(Sl) for all l ∈ {2, . . . , p}. For the remainder, component
refers to a maximally connected set of agents. Take an optimal assignment
xS ∈ XS(N, e, d, r) for S. We recursively determine the transfer tl(x
S) as
the total amount of water transferred to component l from the components
1, . . . , l − 1. Clearly,
t1(x
S) = 0.
Further, it holds that for an optimal assignment, either Sl−1 transfers an
amount of water to Sl greater than the intermediate leakage, or no water at
all. Therefore, for all l ∈ {2, . . . , p}, tl(x





















Note that for all players j such that max(Sl−1) < j < min(Sl), it holds
that j ∈ N \ S. Furthermore,
∑min(Sl)−1
j=max(Sl−1)+1
(dj − ej) is referred to as the
leakage to individualists in-between Sl−1 and Sl. A stream component of S
refers to a collection of components of S which decide to transfer water and
accept all leakage to intermediate individualists. Let partition
{S̃1(x
S), . . . , S̃q(xS)(x
S)}
be the collection of stream components with respect to xS where components
Sl and Sl+1 are in the same stream component if tl+1(x
S) > 0 and are in
different stream components if tl+1(x
S) = 0. Formally, let
L(xS) = {l ∈ {1, . . . , p}|tl(x
S) = 0},
i.e. L(xS) refers to the components of S which do not receive any inflow of up-
stream components. Without loss of generality, let L(xS) = {l1, l2, . . . , lq(xS)},
with l1 < l2 < · · · < lq(xS). Observe that agents upstream of S1 act
individualistic such that l1 = 1. Note that q(x
S) ≤ p. Then, for all
















Now, we clarify RSA-games by means of Example 4.3.1.
Example 4.3.1. Reconsider the RSA problem of Example 4.2.2. Let
S = {1, 2, 4, 5, 6}. One readily checks that for component S1 = {1, 2}, x
S1 =
(3.5, 1.5) is an optimal assignment with total joint reward 39.5, while for
component S2 = {4, 5, 6}, x
S2 = (0, 1.1, 4.4) is an optimal assignment with
total joint reward 53.9. Furthermore, xS = (xS1 , xS2) is an optimal assign-
ment for S with total joint reward 39.5+53.9=93.4. Now, transferring water
from S1 to S2 is not beneficial, i.e. there is no leakage involved. Conse-
quently, as outlined in Figure 4.4, q(xS) = 2, S̃1(x
S) = S1, S̃2(x
S) = S2,
and t2(x
S) = 0. Now consider T = S ∪ {8}. Then one readily verifies that
1:5 2:2 3:6 4:3 5:3 6:7.5 7:1 8:8.5
0.5 0 t2(xS)=0 2 2.9 0 0
3.5 1.5 e3 = 5 0 1.1 4.4 1 0
4 1 5 2 2 1.5 1 0
S1 = S̃1 S2 = S̃2
1:5 2:2 3:6 4:3 5:3 6:7.5 7:1 8:8.5
3 4 t2(xT )=3 5 6.5 6 t3(xT )=6
1 0 d3 = 6 0 0.5 2 d7 = 1 6
4 1 5 2 2 1.5 1 0
T1 T2 T3
T̃1
Figure 4.4: Assignments xS and xT for Example 4.3.1
xT = (1, 0, 0, 0.5, 2, 6) is an optimal assignment for T with total joint reward
116.5. This assignment is outlined in Figure 4.4. Hence, q(xT ) = 1 and T is
one stream component. Now,
t2(x
T ) = (e1 − x
T
1 ) + (e2 − x
T
2 )− (d3 − e3) = 3 + 1− 1 = 3,
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while
t3(x
T ) = t2(x
T ) + (e4 − x
T
4 ) + (e5 − x
T
5 ) + (e6 − x
T
6 )− (d7 − e7)
= 3 + 2 + 1.5− 0.5− 0 = 6.
♦
In Example 4.3.1, the optimal assignment to agents in S is such that no
water is transferred from agents in component S1 to agents in component
S2. However, by adding agent 8, this transfer needs to be reconsidered.
This increases the general complexity of finding an optimal assignment for
arbitrary coalitions. Although Methodology 4.2.3 can be used for the optimal
assignment to components of S, the complexity arises from the fact that all
possible combinations of neighboring components should be checked.
Let {S̃1(x
S), . . . , S̃q(xS)(x
S)} be the collection of stream components of S
with respect to the optimal assignment xS ∈ XS(N, e, d, r). Since there is







This property is referred to as stream component additivity.
Lemma 4.3.2. Let (N, e, d, r) ∈ RSAN and let v ∈ TUN be the correspond-
ing RSA-game. Let S ⊂ N with optimal assignment xS ∈ XS(N, e, d, r) and
let T = {i ∈ N |min(S) ≤ i ≤ max(S)}. If S is one stream component with
respect to xS, then




Proof. Note that T is the connected set of all players in S and all its in-
termediate individualists. For xS it holds that S = S̃1 is a single stream
component, such that all intermediate individualists i ∈ T \ S extract their
demand di. Define assignment x ∈ R
T and xN\T ∈ RN\T such that
xi =
{
xSi , for all i ∈ S,
x
N\S






i = ei for all i ∈ N \ T. (4.17)
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In order to prove feasibility of x, we first prove that the constraints (4.12) -
(4.14) hold for x.
First, (4.12) follows from xi = x
S
i ∈ [0, di] for all i ∈ S, and xi = di for
all i ∈ T \ S. Secondly, observe that from the feasibility of xS, i.e. from
















Furthermore, by equality (4.11) it holds for all i ∈ T \ S, that










































































The second equality holds by (4.16) and (4.17). Similarly, constraint (4.14)
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follows from













































































The second and fifth equality holds by (4.16) and (4.17). The third equality
by feasibility of xS , i.e. equality (4.14). The first and last equality follows
from max(T ) = max(S). Next, this implies,





























where the inequality holds by feasibility of x.
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The following lemma states that two connected sets together can obtain
a greater total joint reward, than both sets separately.
Lemma 4.3.3. Let (N, e, d, r) ∈ RSAN and let v ∈ TUN be the correspond-
ing RSA-game. Let S, T ∈ 2N be such that S is connected, T is connected,
and S ∩ T = ∅. Then,
v(S) + v(T ) ≤ v(S ∪ T ).
Proof. Let xS ∈ XS(N, e, d, r) and xT ∈ XT (N, e, d, r). Define x ∈ RS∪T as
xi = x
S
i for all i ∈ S and xi = x
T
i for all i ∈ T .
Clearly, x ∈ F S∪T (N, e, d, r). Hence, using Corollary 4.3.1


























xS∪T ∈ F S∪T (N, e, d, r)
}
= v(S ∪ T ).
The downstream incremental solution6 DI(v) is such that each player
obtains the extra total joint reward he adds to the set of upstream players.
Hence, for all i ∈ N ,
DIi(v) = v({1, . . . , i})− v({1, . . . , i− 1}).
Lemma 4.3.4 states that for each player i ∈ N the downstream incre-
mental solutions allocates an amount of rewards lower than or equal to the
amount he obtains when demand di is assigned.
Lemma 4.3.4. Let (N, e, d, r) ∈ RSAN and let v ∈ TUN be the correspond-
ing RSA-game. Then, for all i ∈ N ,
ri(di) ≥ DIi(v).
6The downstream incremental solution coincides with the marginal vector mσ(v) of the
RSA-game v corresponding to the order σ = {1, . . . , n}.
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Proof. For i = 1, it holds that DI1 = r1(e1). Lemma 4.3.4 holds by e1 ≤ d1.
Let i ∈ N \ {1}, S = {1, . . . , i − 1}, and T = {1, . . . , i}. Let xS ∈
XS(N, e, d, r) and xT ∈ XT (N, e, d, r) be such that for all j ∈ S it holds that
xSj ≥ x
T
j . From Methodology 4.2.3 it follows that such assignments exist.
Now,































The first inequality follows from xSj ≥ x
T
j and r increasing, the last inequality
from feasibility.
The core of a game consists of those efficient allocations such that no
coalition has an incentive to split off from the grand coalition. Hence, the

















Theorem 4.3.5. Let (N, e, d, r) ∈ RSAN and let v ∈ TUN be the corre-
sponding RSA-game. Then DI(v) ∈ C(v).
Proof. Let xS ∈ XS(N, e, d, r) and {S̃1(x
S), . . . , S̃q(xS)(x
S)} be the collection
of stream components of S with respect to xS . Let DI(v) be the corre-
sponding downstream incremental solution. First note that
∑
j∈N DIj(v) =
v(N) by definition. Secondly, we prove that
∑
j∈SDIj(v) ≥ v(S). For all
l ∈ {1, . . . , q(xS)} let Tl = {i ∈ N |min(S̃l(x
S)) ≤ i ≤ max(S̃l(x
S))} (i.e.
the set of all players in S̃l(x
S) and all its intermediate individualists), and
Ul = {i ∈ N |i < min(S̃l(x
S))} (i.e. the set of all upstream players of S̃l(x
S)).





































































The first equality follows from equality (4.15). The first inequality holds
by Lemma 4.3.2. The second equality follows from the definition of the
downstream incremental solution DI(v). The second inequality by Lemma
4.3.3, and the last inequality by Lemma 4.3.4.
In Example 4.3.2 an RSA-game is provided and the downstream incre-
mental solution is computed.
Example 4.3.2. Consider the RSA problem (N, e, d, r) where N =




z2, r3(z) = 13z − z
2, and r4(z) = 10z. For the coalitional values of
the corresponding RSA-game we refer to the following table.
S 1 2 3 4 1,2 1,3 1,4 2,3 2,4 3,4
v(S) 16 16.875 12 0 37.1 28 16 28.875 16.875 12
S 1,2,3 1,2,4 1,3,4 2,3,4 N
v(S) 49.1 37.5 28 28.875 49.5
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An optimal assignment x for N is given by x = (0.5, 2, 1, 1) and displayed
in Figure 4.5. The downstream incremental solution is given by
1:3 2:7.5 3:1 4:8.5
1.5 1 1
0.5 2 1 1
2 1.5 1 0
Figure 4.5: Optimal assignments x for Example 4.3.2
DI(v) = (16, 21.1, 12, 0.4) ∈ C(v)
Here, for example, DI4(v) = v(N)− v({1, 2, 3}) = 0.4.
Although the downstream incremental solution DI(v) is in the core of the
RSA-game v, it is a rather unsatisfying allocation, especially for upstream
players. For example, 16 is allocated to player 1 according to DI(v), but also
r1(e1) = 16. Hence, he is not compensated for transferring 1.5 of his inflow
of 2 to downstream players. ♦
Example 4.3.2 already indicates a possible drawback of the downstream
incremental solution. Moreover, the allocations in the core are stable, but
stability may contradict the TIBS principle7. For this, note that an allocation
is stable if no coalition has an incentive to split off the grand coalition;
the TIBS principle states that the water of a shared watercourse belongs
to all players combined, such that coalitional deviations are not relevant
in measuring the quality of an allocation. Therefore, we propose a new
allocation based on the methodology of Section 4.2.
Example 4.3.3. Reconsider Example 4.3.2. From Methodology 4.2.3, the
precise contribution of each player can be understood in a finite number of
well specified steps. Table 4.3 provides the initial assignment and, per itera-
tion, the assignment, the agents involved in the transfer for this assignment,
and the extra total reward.
Now consider allocation ψ(N, e, d, r) such that for each step of Methodol-
ogy 4.2.3, the extra joint reward is evenly allocated among the participating
7The TIBS principle is outlined in Section 4.1
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It. Assignment Transfer
Marg. Total Methodology based solution
Reward 1 2 3 4
0 (2, 11
2

































Table 4.3: Methodology based solution of Example 4.3.2
players. For example, in the last step, an extra total joint reward is gen-
erated of 2
5
, which is evenly allocated among players {1, 2, 4}, i.e. in this
iteration agents 1 and 2 transfer water to agent 4. Hence, these players are
allocated 2
15
. For the initial assignment, each agent i ∈ N is allocated ri(ei).
Consequently,













Note that Ψ(N, e, d, r) ∈ C(v). ♦
The following example illustrates that the methodology based solution as
described above is not necessarily in the core of the corresponding game.
Example 4.3.4. Reconsider Example 4.2.2 with optimal assignment x =
(2, 0, 0, 0, 1, 4, 1, 8.5). Table 4.4 summarizes, per iteration, the extra total
joint reward and provides the methodology based solution. Consequently,



























j=3 ψj(N, e, d, r) = 118
1
20
and v({3, . . . , 8}) = 1191
2
, is not a core-
element. As a comparison, the downstream incremental solution equals






















Note that Table 4.4 can also be used to compute DI(N, e, d, r) by allocat-
ing, per iteration, the marginal total reward to the most downstream, i.e.
receiving, agent. ♦
It.
Marg. Total Methodology Based Solution







































































































Scheduling is about the optimal planning of processing a number of jobs
through a number of machines. These economies of scale are fundamental
to manufacturing operations. With respect to scheduling, this phenomenon
manifests itself in efficiencies gained from grouping jobs together. In particu-
lar, so-called family scheduling problems have received considerable attention
in the scheduling literature with setup considerations. These problems con-
sider situations where the jobs can be classified into distinct families with
respect to their production requirements such as the required tooling or con-
tainer size. For the optimal planning various aspects of scheduling are taking
into account. A first consideration is the objective of the optimization such
as earliness (Wan and Yen (2009)), flow time (Mosheiov and Oron (2008)), or
total completion time. Ahn and Hyun (1990), Bruno and Sethi (1978), Ma-
son and Anderson (1991), and Monma and Potts (1989) propose algorithms
for minimizing total weighted flow time on a single machine with family
setup times. We refer to Potts and Kovalyov (2000) for a review of schedul-
ing literature on family scheduling problems. Further we note here that
sequence-dependent setup times tend to make solutions difficult to find. We
refer to Allahverdi et al. (1999) and Allahverdi et al. (2008) for a review of
the scheduling literature with sequence-dependent and sequence-independent
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setup considerations.
In this chapter, which is based on Grundel et al. (2013), we restrict
attention to setup considerations of the following type. A job does not require
a setup when following another job from the same family, but a “family
setup time” is required when it follows a member of another family. An
example of a specific application of this type of family scheduling problems is
a production line of colored plastics (cf. Potts and Van Wassenhove (1992)).
In this setting customer orders can be divided into color groups. A setup is
required when switching from a job of one color to a job of another color.
Some single machine scheduling models consider controllable processing times
(Koulamas et al. (2010),Gordon and Strusevich (2009), Ocetkiewicz (2010)).
To some extent, these models resemble models with family setups. Hence,
if the manufacturer decides to schedule a job after a family member, its
processing time does not include a setup.
Furthermore our framework assumes that per family, a cost function is
defined that depends linearly on the completion time of its members. Com-
mon resources usually operate under a centralized sequencing rule (e.g., first
in first out (FIFO)). Therefore, contrary to what is common in scheduling
literature, we assume that there is an initial processing order σ0 on the jobs
which provides the initial right of each job to be completed at a certain time
with a given set of preceding jobs. From this initial order and the cost func-
tions, the total joint completion costs can be computed. The objective in
our model is to minimize these costs.
Santos and Magazine (1985) analyzed single machine batching situations
with item availability. They show that for each family, an urgency index can
be computed such that, if the jobs are processed in an order of non-increasing
urgency indices, then the total costs are minimized. This result is applicable
to family sequencing situations, since the same objective of minimizing the
total joint completion costs is considered. This result however, cannot be
applied when considering minimizing the total completion costs of subgroups
of jobs since the initial order on jobs puts additional constraints on the order
of jobs within a subgroup. An order is admissible if each job outside the
subgroup is completed at least as early as in the initial order, and its set of
preceding jobs remains unchanged. In this chapter we show that for each
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subgroup there is an optimal order (minimizing the total joint completion
costs of jobs in the subgroup) which (within components) processes all jobs
of the same family consecutively, but which is not necessarily the urgency
order of Santos and Magazine (1985).
After the optimal assignment is obtained, the question arises how the cost
savings should be allocated among the jobs. To analyze this allocation prob-
lem, we define a cooperative family sequencing game, corresponding to the
family sequencing situation, which explicitly takes into account the maximal
cost savings for any subgroup of jobs. The game theoretic analysis of cost
allocation problems arising from sequencing situations dates back to Curiel
et al. (1989) in the setting of one machine sequencing situations with a finite
number of jobs, linear cost functions and an initial order. It was shown that
these games are convex and hence allow for core elements, i.e., efficient allo-
cations that cannot be improved upon by a subgroup of jobs. The following
studies in this strand of literature have extended the basic model by consid-
ering ready times (Hamers et al. (1995)), due dates (Borm et al. (2002)),
precedence relations (Hamers et al. (1995)) and controllable processing times
(Van Velzen (2006)). Klijn and Sánchez (2006) considered sequencing games
without any initial ordering of jobs. The current chapter is one of the first to
explicitly incorporate setup times. Lohmann et al. (2014) analyzes sequen-
cing situations where some setup is required for each job which depends on
its predecessor.
We show that for our class of family sequencing games, the marginal
vector which corresponds to the initial order belongs to the core of the game.
We also show that these games in general are not convex, σ0-component
additive, or permutationally convex (Granot and Huberman (1982)) with
respect to the initial order. Therefore, the proof of the result above does not
rely on standard techniques, but requires a tailor made analysis.
Finally, we specifically analyze the case where the initial order of jobs is
such that all members of the same family are processed consecutively. In this
case it turns out that all subgames in which the last job with respect to the
initial order is not participating, are convex. From this we are able to derive
a core element for the corresponding family sequencing game, based on the
Shapley value (Shapley (1953)).
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The outline of the chapter is as follows. Section 5.2 formally describes
family sequencing situations and analyzes the optimization problem of all
subgroups. With respect to the associated cost allocation problem, Section
5.3 shows that family sequencing games have a nonempty core. In Section
5.4, the specific case of ordered family sequencing is analyzed.
5.2 Family Sequencing Situations
In this section, we consider a one machine sequencing situation in which
a finite number of jobs are queued in front of a machine, waiting to be
processed. The machine can handle at most one job at a time. The set of
jobs is denoted by N . The jobs can be partitioned into families with respect
to their production requirements. Let F be the set of families. A family
function F : N → F associates to each job i ∈ N the family F(i) that it
belongs to. We denote by nk the number of jobs in family k.
An order on the set of jobs is a bijection σ : N → {1, ..., |N |}. We
denote the set of all orders on N by Π(N). Given an order σ ∈ Π(N) the
set of predecessors of a job i ∈ N with respect to σ is defined as P (σ, i) =
{j ∈ N |σ(j) < σ(i)}. Similarly, the set of successors of i with respect to
σ is defined as S(σ, i) = {j ∈ N |σ(j) > σ(i)}. Moreover, let P̄ (σ, i) =
P (σ, i) ∪ {i}.
It is assumed that there is an initial order σ0 on the jobs before the
processing of the machine starts. If a job in family k follows a job of the
same family, then it does not require a setup. However, the family setup
time sk > 0 is required if it is preceded by a job of a different family or if it is
the first job. Observe that the setup times are independent of the family of
the preceding job. We assume that each job of the same family requires the
same processing time which is denoted by pk > 0 for every family k ∈ F . For
each job i ∈ N , the costs ci(t) of spending time t in the system is assumed to
be linear in the completion time. We assume that all jobs of family k have
the same cost parameter αk > 0 such that ci(t) = αkt for all i ∈ F
−1(k).
A one machine sequencing situation as described above is called a family
sequencing situation and is denoted by Σ(N) = (N,F,F , σ0, s, p, α) with
s, p, α ∈ RF++. In a family sequencing situation the completion time C(σ, i)
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where xσ,j equals 1 if job j requires a setup when the jobs are processed with
respect to σ and 0 otherwise, i.e.
xσ,j =
{
1 if σ−1(σ(j)− 1) /∈ F(j) or σ(j) = 1,
0 otherwise.




By reordering the jobs with respect to σ0, the total costs can be reduced. We
call an order optimal if it minimizes the total costs. It was proven by Santos
and Magazine (1985) and, independently, by Dobson et al. (1987) that a
highest urgency comes first (HUCF) order is optimal for family sequencing
situations. An HUCF order processes the jobs of the same family together as
a group (consecutively) and processes these family groups in nonincreasing




the numerator indicates that a family with a high cost parameter is likely to
be processed at the beginning of the optimal order, from the denominator
can be seen that families with a high total processing time are processed in
the tail of the optimal order.
Theorem 5.2.1. (Santos and Magazine (1985)) For every family se-
quencing situation an HUCF order is optimal.
Example 5.2.1. Consider the family sequencing situation (N,F,F , σ0, s, p,
α) with N = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} and F = {1, 2}. Assume that F(1) = F(4) =
F(5) = 1 and F(2) = F(3) = 2. Further, assume that σ0 = (1, 2, 3, 4, 5),
s = (3, 1), p = (1, 4) and α = (4, 6). Then, the urgencies for the families are
u1 = 2 and u2 = 1
1
3
, respectively. Hence, an HUCF order processes the jobs
in family 1 first and then the jobs in family 2. In Figure 5.1, we depict the
processing orders σ0 and an HUCF order σN .







































Figure 5.1: The orders σ0 and σN .
The cost savings obtained by N when using σN equals
∑
j∈N
αF(j)(C(σ0, j)− C(σN , j))
= 4(4− 4) + 6(9− 11) + 6(13− 15) + 4(17− 5) + 4(18− 6) = 72.
♦
For a family sequencing situation Σ(N) = (N,F,F , σ0, s, p, α), the costs
of a subgroup T with respect to an order σ equals
∑
j∈T αF(j)C(σ, j). We
want to determine the maximal cost savings of T when its members decide
to cooperate. For this aim, we have to specify which orders are admissible
for T with respect to the initial order. We assume that an order σ ∈ Π(N)
is admissible for a subgroup T with respect to σ0 if it satisfies the following
two conditions:
(i) P (σ, i) = P (σ0, i) for all i ∈ N\T , and
(ii) C(σ, i) ≤ C(σ0, i) for all i ∈ N\T .
Condition (i) is the standard admissibility requirement in the sequencing
literature and requires that T can achieve cost savings only by changing jobs
within its σ0-components, being the maximally connected subsets of T with
respect to σ0. However, in a family sequencing situation, a subgroup may
negatively affect the jobs outside the subgroup by reordering its jobs within
σ0-components. Hence, we also adopt condition (ii) which guarantees that T
cannot harm the jobs outside T . The set of admissible orders of T is denoted
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by A(T ). Then, the corresponding optimization problem for T in the family






An admissible order for which the minimum is attained is called optimal for
T . The remainder of this section is dedicated to these optimal orders.
Example 5.2.2. Reconsider the family sequencing situation from Example
5.2.1. Now consider the subgroup S = {1, 2, 3}. Observe that the order σ =
(2, 3, 1, 4, 5) is an admissible order for S with respect to σ0: P (σ, i) = P (σ0, i)
for all i ∈ N\S and both C(σ, 4) ≤ C(σ0, 4) and C(σ, 5) ≤ C(σ0, 5). This







































Figure 5.2: The orders σ0 and σ.
The cost savings obtained by S when using σ equal
∑
j∈S αF(j)(C(σ0, j) −
C(σ, j)) = 12. Actually, σ is an optimal order for S. Notice that σ processes
the jobs in family 2 first although with respect to the optimal order for all
jobs, jobs in family 1 are processed first.
Now, consider the subgroup T = {1, 2, 3, 5}. Clearly, σ is an admissible
order for T . Actually, σ is also an optimal order for T . The cost savings
obtained by T using σ equals
∑
j∈T αF(j)(C(σ0, j)− C(σ, j)) = 12 + 4(18 −
15) = 24. That is, when the jobs 1,2 and 3 reorder themselves from σ0 to
σ, also job 5 profits from an earlier completion time and this profit is now
taken into account. ♦
Let T ⊂ N and σ ∈ Π(N) be such that T is a connected subgroup with
respect to σ. Define,
f(σ, T ) = argmin
j∈T
σ(j),
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and
l(σ, T ) = argmax
j∈T
σ(j).
Clearly, f(σ, T ) is the first job within T , and l(σ, T ) the last job within T
with respect to the order σ. We denote by P (σ, T ) the collection of jobs
which precede every member of T in the order σ, i.e.,
P (σ, T ) = {j ∈ N |σ(j) < σ(f(σ, T ))}
and S(σ, T ) the collection of jobs which succeed every member of T in the
order σ,
S(σ, T ) = {j ∈ N |σ(j) > σ(l(σ, T ))}.
Let σ ∈ Π(N). We call a set of jobs that are processed between two
setups when the jobs are processed with respect to σ, a run of σ. Obviously,
all jobs in the same run are of the same family. A run which consists of jobs
of family k is called a run of family k.
An order σ is family ordered if it processes all jobs that belong to the same
family consecutively, i.e. if for every pair of jobs i, j ∈ N where F(i) = F(j)
it holds that h ∈ F(i) for every h with σ(i) < σ(h) < σ(j).
Since a σ0-component of a subgroup can affect the completion times of
the members of another σ0-component behind it (cf. Example 5.2.2), it
is generally not easy to find an optimal admissible order for a subgroup.
Nevertheless, there are useful properties regarding the structure of optimal
admissible orders. In the following theorem we show that for every connected
subgroup, there exist an optimal admissible order that processes the jobs of
the same family consecutively.
Theorem 5.2.2. Let (N,F,F , σ0, s, p, α) be a family sequencing situation
and let T ⊂ N be a subset of jobs. Then, there exists an optimal order for
T which processes all jobs of the same family within a σ0-component of T
consecutively.
Proof. Let T = T1 ∪ T2 ∪ · · · ∪ Tl where for each y ∈ {1, . . . , l}, Ty is a
maximally connected subset of T with respect to σ0. Let σ ∈ A(T ) and
suppose σ is an optimal order for T .
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Fix y ∈ {1, 2, ..., l} and suppose that with respect to σ, family k jobs in
Ty are processed in different runs. Let K1 and K2 be the set of family k jobs
in Ty that belong to the first and second run, respectively. Let M be the
set of jobs (of other families) that are placed in between K1 and K2 with
respect to σ. Let γ be the time to process and setup all jobs in M when
they are processed with respect to σ, i.e., γ =
∑
j∈M(xσ,jsF(j) + pF(j)). Let
i1 = f(σ,K1), i2 = f(σ,K2), m = f(σ,M), and h = f(σ, S(σ,K2)).
Now consider the order σ′ ∈ Π(N) which is obtained from σ by moving
all jobs in K1 to the head of K2 and the order σ
′′ ∈ Π(N) which is obtained
from σ by moving all jobs in K2 to the tail of K1. Figure 5.3 depicts the
orders σ, σ′ and σ′′.
Figure 5.3: The orders σ, σ′ and σ′′.
We start by showing that σ′ and σ′′ are admissible. Next we show that









′′, j)) ≥ 0. (5.2)
First, we show that σ′ is an admissible order for T . Clearly, P (σ′, i) =
P (σ, i) = P (σ0, i) for all i ∈ N\T . It remains to show that C(σ
′, i) ≤ C(σ0, i)
for every i ∈ N\T . Since σ is an admissible order, it is sufficient to show
that C(σ′, i) ≤ C(σ, i) for every i ∈ N\T . Observe that xσ′,j = xσ,j for every
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j ∈ N\{i1, i2, m}. Hence, C(σ
′, i) = C(σ, i) for every i ∈ P (σ,K1) and















(xσ,j − xσ′,j) sF(j)
≥ 0,
for every i ∈ S(σ,M). The inequality follows from xσ,m = 1 which implies
(xσ,m−xσ′,m)sF(m) ≥ 0. Further it holds that xσ,i2 = 1, xσ′,i1+xσ′,i2 = 1, and
sF(i1) = sF(i2) such that
∑
j∈{i1,i2}
(xσ,j − xσ′,j) sF(j) = xσ,i1sF(i1) ≥ 0. Hence,
σ′ ∈ A(T ).
Next we show that σ′′ is an admissible order for T . Obviously, P (σ′′, i) =
P (σ0, i) for every i ∈ N\T . Since σ is an admissible order, it is sufficient
to show that C(σ′′, i) ≤ C(σ, i) for every i ∈ N\T . It can be observed that
xσ′′,i = xσ,i for every i ∈ N\{i2, h}. Hence, C(σ
′′, i) = C(σ, i) for every
i ∈ P (σ,M) and
















for every i ∈ S(σ,K2). Clearly, xσ,i2 = 1 and xσ′′,i2 = 0. However, xσ,h can
either be 0 or 1. First assume that xσ,h = 0, i.e., h is member of family k.
Hence, xσ′′,h = 1 and
∑
j∈{i2,h}
(xσ,j−xσ′′,j)sF(j) = (1−0)sF(i2)+(0−1)sF(h) = (1−0)sk+(0−1)sk = 0.
Next assume that xσ,h = 1. Then,
∑
j∈{i2,h}
(xσ,j − xσ′′,j)sF(j) = (1− 0)sk + (1− xσ′′,h)sF(h)
≥ (1− 0)sk + (1− 1)sF(h) = sk.
Hence C(σ, i) − C(σ′′, i) ≥ 0 for every i ∈ S(σ,K2). This yields that σ
′′ ∈
A(T ).
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αF(j) (C(σ, j)− C(σ
′, j)) , (5.3)
where the inequality follows from the fact that C(σ′, i) = C(σ, i) for every
i ∈ P (σ,K1) and C(σ, i)− C(σ
′, i) ≥ 0 for every i ∈ S(σ,M). Moreover, for
every i ∈M it holds that
C(σ, i)− C(σ′, i) =
∑
j∈K1
(xσ,jsF(j) + pF(j)) + (xσ,m − xσ′,m)sF(m)
= xσ,i1sk + |K1|pk + (xσ,m − xσ′,m)sF(m)
= xσ,i1sk + |K1|pk + (1− xσ′,m)sF(m)
≥ |K1|pk, (5.4)
and for every i ∈ K1
C(σ, i)− C(σ′, i) = −
∑
j∈M
(xσ′,jsF(j) + pF(j))− (xσ′,i1 − xσ,i1)sk
≥ −(γ + sk). (5.5)
The inequality follows from xσ′,i1 = 1 and
∑
j∈M
(xσ′,jsF(j) + pF(j)) =
{
γ, if xσ′,m = 1,
γ − sF(m), if xσ′,m = 0.
Consequently, by inequalities (5.3)-(5.5), we have that
∑
j∈T
αF(j) (C(σ, j)− C(σ















αF(j) (C(σ, j)− C(σ
′′, j)) ,
which follows from C(σ′′, i) = C(σ, i) for every i ∈ P (σ,M) and C(σ, i) −
C(σ′′, i) ≥ 0 for every i ∈ S(σ,K2). Moreover,
C(σ, i)− C(σ′′, i) =
{
γ + sk, if i ∈ K2,
−|K2|pk, if i ∈M,





′′, j)) ≥ |K2|
(






The right-hand side in either (5.6), or (5.7) is non-negative, which shows
that either (5.1) or (5.2) is satisfied.
From Theorem 5.2.2, it follows that for the optimization problem for a
subgroup of jobs, the urgency indices of the jobs are not the only factor to take
into consideration. Apparently, the structure of families within the subgroup
is also of concern. Therefore, the family urgency index for subgroups of
agents is introduced.
Let Σ(N) = (N,F,F , σ0, s, p, α) be a family sequencing situation and let
T be a connected subset with respect to σ0. Let F(T ) =
⋃
i∈T
F(i) be the set
of families associated to T . For k ∈ F(T ), let nT,k be the number of jobs of





Now, assume that F(l(σ0, T )) = k̄(T ). The tail-adjusted family urgency
index u′T,l for T is defined as
u′T,l =
{
uT,l if l 6= k̄(T ),
0 if l = k̄(T ).
for all l ∈ F(T ). Hence, the family of the last job in T (with respect to σ0)
obtains the lowest urgency index.
An order σ ∈ Π(N) is called an HUCF order for T , where T is connected
with respect to σ0, if
(i) P (σ, i) = P (σ0, i) for every i ∈ N\T , and
(ii) σ is family ordered and processes the family groups in non-increasing
order of the family urgency index for T .
An order σ ∈ Π(N) is called a tail-adjusted HUCF order for T , where T
is connected with respect to σ0, if
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(i) P (σ, i) = P (σ0, i) for every i ∈ N\T , and
(ii) σ is family ordered and processes the family groups in non-increasing
order of the tail-adjusted family urgency index for T .
This yields that the family members of the last job in T (with respect to σ0)
are processed last.
In the following lemma, we focus on the structure of the optimal orders
for connected subgroups which include the job that is processed first with
respect to σ0. We show that for these subgroups, either an HUCF order or a
tail-adjusted HUCF order is optimal. IF HUCF order is not admissible for
T , then this is because additional setup time is induced for the first job after
T . In that case, the tail-adjusted HUCF order keep the last job of T equal
to the initial order σ0.
Lemma 5.2.3. Let Σ(N) = (N,F,F , σ0, s, p, α) be a family sequencing sit-
uation and T be a connected subgroup with respect to σ0 with σ
−1
0 (1) ∈ T .
Then,
(i) if an HUCF order for T is admissible, then it is optimal for T .
(ii) if an HUCF order for T is not admissible, then a tail-adjusted HUCF
order for T is optimal for T .
Proof. Let σ ∈ Π(N) be an HUCF order for T .
(i) Let σ ∈ A(T ). From Theorem 5.2.1 and Theorem 5.2.2 it immediately
follows that σ is optimal.
(ii) Let σ /∈ A(T ). Then, clearly, S(σ0, T ) 6= ∅. Define h = f(σ0, S(σ0, T )).
We first prove the following claim:
Claim: Let π ∈ Π(N) be such that P (π, i) = P (σ0, i) for all i ∈ N \ T ,
π is family ordered for T , and π /∈ A(T ). Then C(π, h) > C(σ0, h), xπ,h = 1
and xσ0,h = 0.
Proof of the claim: Since π /∈ A(T ) and P (π, i) = P (σ0, i) for all
i ∈ N \ T , it holds that
C(π, i) > C(σ0, i), (5.8)
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for some i ∈ S(π, T ). Since σ−10 (1) ∈ T and since π is family ordered, the
number of setups in T are minimized, which implies the total setup time is
minimized, and, consequently
C(π, l(π, T )) ≤ C(σ0, l(σ0, T )).
Hence, since π and σ0 coincide after the last job in T , for (5.8) to hold it must
be the case that xπ,h = 1 and xσ0,h = 0, while in fact C(π, h) > C(σ0, h).
This proves the claim. Clearly, the claim implies that
C(σ, h) > C(σ0, h), xσ,h = 1, and xσ0,h = 0. (5.9)
Let σ′ ∈ Π(N) denote a tail-adjusted HUCF order for T . Since σ′ is
family ordered, P (σ′, i) = P (σ0, i) for all i ∈ N \T , and xσ′,h = 0, we readily
see from the claim that σ′ ∈ A(T ).
Now consider an arbitrary order τ ∈ Π(N) with τ ∈ A(T ). We prove
that all jobs in T that are within F(h) are processed last in T . From (5.9),
it follows that T ∩ F(h) 6= ∅. Now suppose xτ,h = 1 or that at least two




(sk + nT,kpk) + sF(h) + pF(h)
= C(σ, h)
> C(σ0, h).
The equality holds by the fact that σ is an HUCF order and xσ,h = 1. The
strict inequality follows from (5.9). This establishes a contradiction with the
admissibility of τ . Hence, for each admissible order there is no setup required
for job h, and the members of F(h) are not processed in different runs in T .
This implies that for each admissible order all members of F(h) are sent to
the back of T . The tail-adjusted HUCF order σ′ satisfies this condition.
It remains to prove that σ′ is optimal for the set T ′ = {i ∈ T |F(i) 6=
F(h)}. This is obvious by applying (i) since σ′ is defined as an HUCF order
for T ′ which is admissible for T ′.
The following example illustrates Lemma 5.2.3.
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Example 5.2.3. Reconsider the family sequencing situation from Example




respectively. Since k̄(S) = 2, the tail-adjusted urgencies in S are u′S,1 = 1
and u′S,2 = 0, respectively. Hence, σ = (2, 1, 3, 4, 5) is an HUCF order and
σ′ = σ0 = (1, 2, 3, 4, 5) is a tail-adjusted HUCF order for S.
By the fact that σ is not admissible for S, i.e. σ /∈ A(S), the tail-adjusted
order σ′ is optimal for S. By σ′ = σ0 it holds that
∑
j∈T αF(j)(C(σ0, j) −
C(σ′, j)) = 0. ♦
5.3 Family Sequencing Games
A transferable utility (TU) game is an ordered pair (N, v) where N is the
finite set of players, and v the characteristic function on 2N , the collection
of all subsets of N . The function v assigns to every coalition T ∈ 2N a real
number v(T ), with v(∅) = 0. As far as it concerns family sequencing games,
we denote a subgroup of jobs T , by coalition T . Here, v(T ) is called the
worth or value of coalition T . The set of all TU-games with player set N is
denoted by TUN . Where no confusion arises, we write v rather than (N, v).
A game v is called monotonic if v(S) ≤ v(T ) for every S ⊂ T and v is called
superadditive if v(S) + v(T ) ≤ v(S ∪ T ) for every S, T ∈ 2N with T ∩ S = ∅.
A game v is convex if a player’s marginal contribution does not decrease if
he joins a larger coalition, i.e., v(T ∪ {i}) − v(T ) ≥ v(S ∪ {i}) − v(S) for
every i ∈ N and S, T ⊂ N\{i} with S ⊂ T .
The core of a game v, denoted by Core(v), is defined as the set of efficient











xj = v(N) and
∑
j∈S




A game with a nonempty core is called balanced.
A coalition S ⊂ N is called connected with respect to an order σ ∈ Π(N)
if for all i, j ∈ S and h ∈ N such that σ(i) < σ(h) < σ(j) it holds that h ∈ S.
For a coalition S, S\σ denotes the set of σ-components of S.
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Let σ ∈ Π(N). A TU-game v is called σ-component additive if it satisfies
the following three conditions:
(i) v({i}) = 0 for all i ∈ N ,
(ii) v is superadditive, and
(iii) v(S) =
∑
T∈S\σ v(T ) for all S ∈ 2
N .
Le Breton et al. (1992) showed that σ-component additive games are bal-
anced.
In a family sequencing game corresponding to a family sequencing sit-
uation, players will correspond to jobs, and the value of a coalition T is
defined as the maximum cost savings that coalition T can achieve by means
of an admissible order in A(T ). Formally, the family sequencing game v
corresponding to a family sequencing situation Σ(N) = (N,F,F , σ0, s, p, α)
is defined by





αF(j) (C(σ0, j)− C(σ, j))
}
for every T ⊂ N . It readily follows that v is monotonic.
Example 5.3.1. Reconsider the family sequencing situation of Examples
5.2.1 - 5.2.3. Since σ = (2, 3, 1, 4, 5) is an optimal order for S = {1, 2, 3}
and T = {1, 2, 3, 5}, it holds, for the corresponding family sequencing game
v, that v(S) = 12 and v(T ) = 24. From this, one can see that the game
is not σ0-component additive; {1, 2, 3} and {5} are the σ0-components of
{1, 2, 3, 5}, but v({1, 2, 3, 5}) = 24 6= 12 = v({1, 2, 3}) + v({5}).
The complete family sequencing game v is given by: v(N) =
v({2, 3, 4, 5}) = 72, v({1, 2, 3, 4}) = 59, v({1, 2, 3, 5}) = 24, v({2, 3, 4}) = 36,
v({1, 2, 3}) = 12 and v(S) = 0 for every remaining coalition S ∈ 2N .
Also observe that this game is not convex since for i = 1, S = {2, 3}, and
T = {2, 3, 4, 5},
v(T ∪ {i})− v(T ) = 0 < 12 = v(S ∪ {i})− v(S).
♦
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Let v ∈ TUN . Themarginal vector mσ(v) ∈ RN with respect to σ ∈ Π(N)
is defined, for each i ∈ N , by
mσi (v) = v(P̄ (σ, i))− v(P (σ, i)).
A concept that is closely related to convexity is permutationally convexity.
The game v is permutationally convex with respect to σ ∈ Π(N) if
v(P̄ (σ, i) ∪ T )− v(P̄ (σ, i)) ≤ v(P̄ (σ, j) ∪ T )− v(P̄ (σ, j)),
for every i, j ∈ N with σ(i) < σ(j) and T ⊂ S(σ, j). Permutational convexity
with respect to an order σ ∈ Π(N) is a well-known sufficient condition for the
corresponding marginal vector mσ(v) to be a core element (cf. Granot and
Huberman (1982)). In the following example we show that family sequencing
games need not be permutationally convex with respect to initial order σ0.
Example 5.3.2. Consider the family sequencing situation Σ(N) = (N,F,
F , σ0, s, p, α) with N = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} and F = {1, 2, 3, 4}. Assume that
F(1) = F(3) = 1, F(2) = 2, F(4) = F(5) = 3 and F(6) = 4. Furthermore,
let σ0 = (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6), s = (2, 2, 1, 5), p = (1, 2, 2, 5) and α = (10, 10, 10, 1).
Finally, let v be the family sequencing game corresponding to Σ(N).
Consider the coalitions
S = P̄ (σ0, 3) = {1, 2, 3}, S
′ = P̄ (σ0, 3) ∪ {6} = {1, 2, 3, 6},
W = P̄ (σ0, 4) = {1, 2, 3, 4}, W
′ = P̄ (σ0, 4) ∪ {6} = {1, 2, 3, 4, 6}.






. Hence, σS =
(1, 3, 2, 4, 5, 6) is an HUCF order for S. Clearly, σS is admissible for S.
Then, by Lemma 5.2.3, σS is optimal for S.










σW = (1, 3, 4, 2, 5, 6) is an HUCF order for W . It can easily be observed that
σW is admissible for W . Then, by Lemma 5.2.3, σW is optimal for W .
Clearly, σS is also an optimal order for S
′ while σW is also an optimal
order for W ′. Then, v is not permutationally convex with respect to σ0 since
2 = v(S ′)− v(S) > v(W ′)− v(W ) = 1.
♦
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In the next theorem we will prove that for each family sequencing game,
the marginal vector with respect to the initial order is stable and efficient, i.e.
v is balanced. In the literature on sequencing games, balancedness of a game
v is often proved by using the fact that v ∈ TUN is σ0-component additive.
However, in Example 5.3.1, it is shown that family sequencing games need
not be σ0-component additive. For sequencing games with controllable pro-
cessing times, Van Velzen (2006) proved balancedness by using the property
of permutationally convexity. From Example 5.3.2 it can be seen that family
sequencing games are not permutationally convex with respect to σ0. Hence,
the balancedness of family sequencing games cannot be proved using stan-
dard techniques. However, a direct, but technically intricate proof, shows
that the marginal vector corresponding to the initial order, σ0, does belong
to the core of a family sequencing game. For this proof we introduce some
orders which we prove to be admissible and hence have a completion time
smaller than or equal to the completion time of the initial order.
Theorem 5.3.1. Let Σ(N) = (N,F,F , σ0, s, p, α) be a family sequencing
situation and let v ∈ TUN be the corresponding sequencing game. Then,
mσ0(v) ∈ Core(v).
Proof. Let T\σ0 = {T1, T2, ..., Tl} be such that Ty ⊂ P (σ0, Ty+1) for every
y ∈ {1, ..., l − 1}. Here P (σ0, T y + 1) = P (σ0, f(σ0, Ty+1)), i.e. the set of
predecessors of the first job within Ty+1 with respect to σ0. Let σ ∈ A(T ) be
an optimal order for T .


























5.3. Family Sequencing Games 107






αF(j) (C(σ0, j)− C(σ, j)) , (5.10)
for every y ∈ {1, 2, ..., l}.
Pick y ∈ {1, 2, ..., l}. Let D = P (σ0, Ty) and E = D ∪ Ty. If D = ∅,
then y = 1 and (5.10) follows from Lemma 5.2.3 and Theorem 5.2.2, which
implies that σ is also an optimal order for T1. Hence,
∑
j∈T1
mσ0j (v) = v(T1) =
∑
j∈T1
αF(j) (C(σ0, j)− C(σ, j)) .








αF(j) (C(σ0, j)− C(σ, j)) ≥ 0. (5.11)
In the remainder of this proof we consider an order µ for E which is the
combination of an optimal order for Ty and an optimal order for D. If µ is
admissible for E, then inequality (5.11) can be shown directly. If µ is not
admissible, then we construct an adjusted admissible order µ′ to indirectly
verify (5.11).
First, we denote by σy and by σ~y the orders defined by
σy(i) =
{














Notice that σ~y is an admissible order for E. Moreover, let π be an optimal




αF(j) (C(σ0, j)− C(π, j)) .
108 Chapter 5. Family Sequencing and Cooperation
Since σ−10 (1) ∈ D, we can choose π to be either an HUCF order for D or a




π(i), if i ∈ D,
σy(i), otherwise.
Observe that P (σ0, i) = P (µ, i) for every i ∈ N\E.
Let iy = f(σ, Ty) and k = F(iy). For all i ∈ S(σ0, D), observe that















sF(j)(xσ~y ,j − xµ,j) + sk(xσ~y ,iy − xµ,iy)
≥ sk(xσ~y ,iy − xµ,iy). (5.12)
Here the second equality follows from the fact that P̄ (σ~y, i) = P̄ (µ, i) for ev-
ery i ∈ S(σ0, D) and xσ~y ,i = xµ,i for every i ∈ S(σ0, D)\{iy}. The inequality
follows from the fact that, with respect to µ, the members of D are processed
according to π which is an HUCF or a tail-adjusted HUCF order for D and
these orders require the minimum total setup time to process the jobs in D.
Hence, for all h ∈ F(D) it holds that
∑
j∈D:j∈F−1(h)





We now distinguish between two cases.
First assume xσ~y ,iy − xµ,iy ≥ 0. Then, µ is admissible for E. For this,
first observe that P (σ0, i) = P (µ, i) for every i ∈ N\E = S(σ0, E). Next, by
admissibility of σ~y, it holds that C(σ0, i) ≥ C(σ~y, i) for every i ∈ S(σ0, E).
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Hence, by inequality (5.12) it holds that C(σ~y, i) ≥ C(µ, i) for every i ∈




αF(j) (C(σ0, j)− C(µ, j)) . (5.13)








αF(j) (C(σ0, j)− C(µ, j))−
∑
j∈D












αF(j) (C(σ~y, i)− C(µ, j))





The first equality follows from the fact that C(π, i) = C(µ, i) for all
i ∈ D. The second equality holds by C(σ, i) = C(σ~y, i) for all i ∈ Ty. The
second inequality follows from (5.12). Hence, inequality (5.11) is satisfied if
xσ~y ,iy − xµ,iy ≥ 0.
Secondly, assume xσ~y ,iy − xµ,iy < 0, i.e., for the rest of the proof assume
that xσ~y ,iy = 0 and xµ,iy = 1. Since xσ~y ,iy = 0, F(iy) = F(l(σy, D)) =
F(l(σ~y, D)) = k. Observe that l(σ~y, D) = l(σ0, D). Moreover, from xµ,iy = 1
it follows that F(l(µ,D)) 6= k. Since F(l(µ,D)) = F(l(π,D)) this implies
that π cannot be a tail-adjusted HUCF order for D. So, π can be chosen to
be an HUCF order for D.
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Note that M 6= ∅. Order µ′ is obtained from µ by moving all jobs in K2
to the tail of R1. Figure 5.4 depicts the orders σ~y, µ, and µ
′, and K1, K2,
R1, and M .
Figure 5.4: The orders σ~y, µ and µ
′.




αF(j) (C(µ, j)− C(µ

















αF(j) (C(σ0, j)− C(σ, j))




αF(j) (C(σ0, j)− C(µ, j)) +
∑
j∈E





αF(j) (C(σ0, j)− C(π, j))−
∑
j∈Ty











αF(j) (C(σ0, j)− C(π, j))−
∑
j∈Ty























Here the first inequality follows from the admissibility of µ′ and the second
from (5.14). The first equality follows from rewriting and the optimality
of order π for D, the second from the fact that C(π, i) = C(µ, i) for all
i ∈ D. The third equality holds by C(σ, i) = C(σ~y, i) for all i ∈ Ty. The last
inequality holds due to (5.12). By assumption it holds that xσ~y ,iy = 0 and
xµ,iy = 1 such that the last equality holds.
First we prove that µ′ is an admissible order for E. Clearly, P (µ′, i) =
P (µ, i) = P (σ0, i) for all i ∈ N \E. So, it is sufficient to show that C(µ
′, i) ≤
C(σ0, i) for every i ∈ N \ E.
Let h = f(µ, S(µ,K2)). Observe that h is not necessarily an element of
Ty. For every i ∈ S(µ,K2) it holds that











= sk + (xµ,h − xµ′,h)sF(h). (5.15)
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If xµ,h = 1, then for every i ∈ S(µ,K2) it follows that
C(µ′, i) = C(µ, i)− sk − (xµ,h − xµ′,h)sF(h)
≤ C(µ, i)− sk
≤ C(σ~y, i)
≤ C(σ0, i).
Here the equality holds by (5.15). The first inequality holds by assumption,
the second by (5.12), and the third by σ~y ∈ A(E). Hence, µ
′ is an admissible
order for E.
If xµ,h = 0 then by definition of K2 it holds that h /∈ Ty and Ty = K2.
Hence, it follows that C(π, i) = C(µ, i) for all i ∈ S(σ0, E). Further it holds
that F(h) = k and xµ′,h = 1. Now, for all i ∈ N \ E,
C(µ′, i) = C(µ, i) = C(π, i) ≤ C(σ0, i).
Here the first equality follows from (5.15), where xµ,h = 0, xµ′,h = 1, and
F(h) = k. The inequality holds since π ∈ A(D). Hence, µ′ is an admissible
order for E.
It remains to prove that inequality (5.14) holds. Let γ be the time to
process and setup all jobs in M when they are processed with respect to µ,
i.e., γ =
∑




αF(j) ≥ 0. (5.16)
Let π′ be the order obtained from π by taking all jobs in R1 behind M .
Figure 5.5 depicts the two orders π and π′.
Figure 5.5: The orders π and π′.
Since π is optimal for D, π is not tail-adjusted HUCF, and since the
number of setups in π is equal to the number of setups in π′, order π′ is
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admissible for D. Observe that for all i ∈ D




0 if i ∈ D\(M ∪ R1),
γ if i ∈ R1,































αF(j) (C(σ0, j)− C(π, j))−
∑
j∈D





αF(j) (C(σ0, j)− C(π
′, j))
≥ 0,
where the second equality holds by (5.17) and the last equality follows from
the fact that π is an optimal order for D. The inequality holds by the











With respect to (5.14), observe that for i ∈ E








0, if i ∈ P (µ,M),
−|K2|pk, if i ∈M,
γ + sk, if i ∈ K2,
sk + (xµ,h − xµ′,h)sj if i ∈ Ty \K2.
(5.19)



























































The second equality follows from (5.19). The first inequality follows from
the fact that if Ty \K2 6= ∅, then xµ,h = 1. The last inequality follows from
(5.18). Hence, (5.14) is verified. This concludes the proof.
Theorem 5.3.1 tells us that the set of stable and efficient allocations is
nonempty. On the other hand, although mσ0(v) is in the core, it is not
very desirable for an effective sharing of the savings. For example, by this
allocation rule the first job in the initial processing order obtains nothing
although this may be a key job to obtain savings.
5.4 Ordered Family Sequencing Games
In this section we consider ordered family sequencing situations. A family
sequencing situation is called ordered if the initial order σ0 is family ordered.
Note that since all family members are processed consecutively, the number
of setups is minimized in σ0.
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Let n = σ−10 (|N |). For a game v ∈ TU
N the subgame v−n ∈ TUN\{n} is
defined by
v−n(S) = v(S),
for all S ∈ 2N\{n}. Hence, v−n coincides with v for all coalitions where the
last job (with respect to σ0) does not participate. The next theorem shows,
for ordered family sequencing situations, that v−n is convex and that v has
a component additive value structure.
Theorem 5.4.1. Let Σ(N) = (N,F,F , σ0, s, p, α) be an ordered family se-
quencing situation with corresponding family sequencing game v ∈ TUN . Let
n = σ−10 (|N |). Then,




v(T ) for all S ∈ 2N .
Proof. Set f = |F |. Let Fk = F
−1(k) be the set of family members of family
k ∈ F ordered in such a way that
σ0(i) < σ0(j)
whenever i ∈ Fk, j ∈ Fl with k, l ∈ F and k < l. Note that n ∈ Ff . Let
S ⊂ N , ,KS ⊂ F denotes the set of families for which each member is in S,
and P S ⊂ F denotes the set of families in S for which at least one family








with GSk ( Fk for all k ∈ P
S, where GSk is the set of members of family
k ∈ P S which are in S.
Since the number of setups is minimized in σ0, the number of setups
equals f and
C(σ0, n) = min
σ∈Π(N\{n})
C(σ, n).
Consequently, each admissible order for an arbitrary coalition of N \{n} has
to remain family ordered.
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Consider the standard sequencing situation (N̂, σ̂0, p̂, α̂) with
N̂ = {1, 2, . . . , f − 1} and
σ̂0(k) = k,
p̂k = sk + nkpk,
α̂k = nkαk,
for k ∈ N̂ . Denote the corresponding standard sequencing game by v̂ ∈
TU N̂ . It follows from Curiel et al. (1989) that v̂ is convex and σ̂0-component
additive. Then explicitly using the fact that each admissible order for N \{n}









(i) Let i ∈ N \ {n} and consider S ⊂ T ⊂ N \ {n, i}. For convexity of
v−n, it suffices to prove that
v−n(S ∪ {i})− v−n(S) ≤ v−n(T ∪ {i})− v−n(T ),
or equivalently, that
v(S ∪ {i})− v(S) ≤ v(T ∪ {i})− v(T ). (5.22)
From (5.20) and (5.21) and the fact that each admissible order for S has to

















The first equality follows from (5.20), the second from the fact that jobs in
GS are fixed, and the third from (5.21). Similarly, v(T ) = v̂(KT ). Also note
that KS ⊂ KT .
If KS∪{i} = KS, then v(S ∪ {i}) = v̂(KS) = v(S) and (5.22) holds by
monotonicity.
If KS∪{i} 6= KS, then
S ∪ {i} =
⋃
k∈KS
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and
T ∪ {i} =
⋃
k∈KT





v(S ∪ {i})− v(S) = v̂(KS ∪ F−1(i))− v̂(KS)
≤ v̂(KT ∪ F−1(i))− v̂(KT )
= v(T ∪ {i})− v(T ).
The inequality holds since v̂ is convex.
(ii) Set S\σ0 = {S1, . . . , Sl} such that Sy ⊂ P (σ, Sy+1) for every y ∈
{1, . . . , l − 1}. It follows that if n ∈ S, then n is in the last connected set,
















y may be empty
for some y ∈ {1, . . . , l}.
First let S ⊂ N\{n}. Since each admissible order remains family ordered,
it suffices to prove (ii) for a coalition S =
⋃
k∈KS
Fk (i.e. with P
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The third equality holds since v̂ is σ̂0-component additive. This proves (ii)
for S ⊂ N \ {n}.
Secondly, let n ∈ S. Let π be an optimal order for
⋃l−1
y=1 Sy, µ an optimal





π(i) if i ∈
⋃l−1
y=1 Sy,
µ(i) if i ∈ Sl,
σ0(i) otherwise.
Using the fact that σ0 is family ordered, one readily verifies that π is also
family ordered and
C(σ, i) = C(σ0, i) (5.23)








αF(j) (C(σ0, j)− C(σ, j)) +
∑
j∈Sl




αF(j) (C(σ0, j)− C(π, j)) +
∑
j∈Sl




















where the fifth equality follows from (5.23). This finishes the proof of (ii).
In the following theorem, the relation between the core of an ordered
family sequencing game vn and the corresponding subgame v−n is provided.
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Theorem 5.4.2. Let Σ(N) = (N,F,F , σ0, s, p, α) be an ordered family se-
quencing situation where n = σ−10 (|N |), with corresponding family sequencing
game v ∈ TUN , and subgame v−n ∈ TUN\n with x−n ∈ Core(v−n). Then,
(
x−n, v(N)− v(N \ {n})
)
∈ Core(v).
Proof. It suffices to show that the marginal vector mσ(v), for an arbitrary
σ ∈ Π(N) such that σ(n) = n, belongs to the core of v. Let σ ∈ Π(N). It
suffices to prove that, for every S ⊂ N , it holds that
∑
j∈S
mσj (v) ≥ v(S).
Define σ′ ∈ Π(N \ {n}) by σ′(i) = σ(i) for all i ∈ N \ {n}.









−n) ≥ v−n(S) = v(S),
where the inequality follows from Theorem 5.4.1(i).
Let S ⊂ N such that n ∈ S. Set S\σ0 = {S1, . . . , Sl} such that Sy ⊂
P (σ, f(σ, Sy+1)) for every y ∈ {1, . . . , l − 1}. It follows that n ∈ Sl. Choose
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The first inequality follows from Theorem 5.4.1(i). The second and third
inequalities are due to the fact that x ∈ Core(v). The last equality follows
from Theorem 5.4.1(ii).
Theorem 5.4.1 and Theorem 5.4.2 allows us to provide a suitable solution
concept for family ordered sequencing situations. For this purpose we use the
Shapley value (Shapley (1953)). The Shapley value is defined as the average







for all v ∈ TUN . In Corollary 5.4.3 a Shapley-based core allocation is con-
structed for ordered family sequencing games.
Corollary 5.4.3. Let Σ(N) = (N,F,F , σ0, s, p, α) be an ordered family se-
quencing situation with corresponding family sequencing game v ∈ TUN . Let
n = σ−10 (|N |). Then,
(
Φ(v−n), v(N)− v(N \ {n})
)
∈ Core(v).
The following example illustrates that, in general, the solution concept
from Corollary 5.4.3 is not efficient for family sequencing games.
Example 5.4.1. Reconsider the family sequencing game of Example 5.3.1
with set of jobs N = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} and v(N) = 72. Note that σ0 is not family
ordered. Then,
(















This can be seen from the fact v(N) = v({2345}) such that x1 = 0 for all
x ∈ Core(v). ♦
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